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Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge、Quality Of Information Disclosure And Stock Price Crash Risk

Posted on:2023-12-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y C RongFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306767983319Subject:Investment science
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Equity pledge is a kind of financing way to shareholders of listed companies are commonly used,but in at the same time,provide convenience for the equity pledge has brought certain risks to the listed company,many controlling shareholders of listed companies in 2018 near the pledge equity reached the open line,caused the market panic,the controlling shareholder equity pledge after the risk has attracted widespread attention Then,will controlling shareholder’s equity pledge cause stock price collapse of listed companies? At the same time,the existing research shows that the company has a direct effect on share price information,information disclosure is an important means of capital market manipulation of company share price,the controlling shareholder equity pledge to avoid control transfer,after may exist to manipulate the company’s disclosure,tend to hide or delay disclosure of bad news,there are opportunistic behavior.Then,is there any manipulation of information disclosure after controlling shareholder’s equity pledge? Will the manipulation of information disclosure affect the quality of information disclosure? Does this manipulation of disclosure stabilise the share price as controlling shareholders hope,or does it increase volatility and even the likelihood of a crash on the contrary?Based on the above problems,this thesis selects China’s A-share listed companies from2015 to 2020 as samples to study the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and stock price crash risk with the quality of information disclosure as an intermediary variable,in an attempt to explore whether the quality of information disclosure plays an intermediary role in the relationship between the two.Empirical research found that:First,the controlling shareholder after some or all of the equity pledge to strengthen the "tunneling",are more likely to be due to the pursuit of self-interest maximization using its control to unethical means to seek personal gain,which cause adverse effect to the company,lead to the company’s share price collapse risk increases,and the effect on non-state and hired in the big four audit firm performance is more significant.Second,after the controlling shareholder equity pledge,for avoid control transfer or hide self-interest behavior motivation and not enough objective when released information,people tend to exaggerate or retain,led to the decrease of the quality of the information disclosure,leading to increase the degree of deviating from the intrinsic value of a stock’s market value,at the same time increased the analysts forecast error,the possibility of increasing share prices collapse phenomenon,That is,the quality of information disclosure plays a part of positive mediating effect.On this basis,this thesis uses propensity score matching method and instrumental variable method to conduct endogeneity test,and carries out robustness test through substitution variable index,sub-sample regression and extended time interval,and the conclusions are basically consistent.Based on the above empirical conclusions,this thesis puts forward the following suggestions: First,regulators should further standardize the process of equity pledge by controlling shareholders of listed companies and strengthen the supervision of the information disclosed by equity pledge companies;Second,shareholders holding controlling shares of listed companies should have a clear understanding of the risk of equity pledge financing,and the company’s management should maintain independent business decisions to avoid being controlled by controlling shareholders;Third,investors should view the information published by listed companies objectively,pay attention to the quality rating of information disclosure,and pay attention to identify the opportunistic motives of equity pledge companies.This thesis enriched the controlling shareholder equity pledge impact on stock price crash risk research,discusses the information disclosure quality of partial mediation effect,to improve listed companies disclose the relevant information in a timely and truly,reduce the possibility of a share price collapse phenomenon,promote the rational allocation of capital,capital market steady development has practical significance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge, Stock Price Crash Risk, Quality of Information Disclosure
PDF Full Text Request
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