China’s financial market shoulders the requirement of stable development and serving the real economy,but also faces the imperfect and fragile situation of the market.As a relatively convenient financing method,equity pledge can effectively solve the problem of financing restrictions,and is favored by the controlling shareholders of listed companies.However,at the same time,the extensive equity pledge has affected the value of the company and exacerbated the risk of share price collapse,which is not good to the development of China’s capital market.Therefore,this paper explores the effect of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on the stock price.This paper analyzes the current situation of equity pledge in domestic A-share market and puts forward the corresponding theoretical assumptions by combining principal-agent theory,private interest theory of control and information asymmetry theory.Based on theoretical analysis,this paper takes A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as the research sample,and finds that:firstly,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders will significantly increase the risk of stock price crash.Secondly,the nature of controlling shareholders’ equity has an important effect on the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and the stock price crash risk.Compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises’ controlling shareholders’ equity pledge has a stronger positive correlation with stock price crash risk.Thirdly,The size of controlling shareholder’s control right is also an important moderating factor.The stronger the control right is,the weaker the impact of equity pledge on stock price crash risk is.Therefore,government agencies should further smooth the financing channels of enterprises,improve the policies and regulations of equity pledge,and strengthen the guidance and supervision of listed companies,standardize the requirements of equity pledge information disclosure,in order to reduce the degree of information asymmetry.Listed companies need to improve their operation and management ability,internally supervise the market value management behavior of controlling shareholders,do a good job in liquidity management,and make rational use of equity pledge financing means.The pledging Party led by banks and securities companies should strengthen the supervision of the pledgor and clarify the flow of funds.The majority of investors should also strengthen the study of financial knowledge and improve their anti-risk ability.In this paper,the nature of equity and shareholder control rights are added as moderating variables to consider the influence degree of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on stock price crash risk under different influencing factors,and improve the analysis of corresponding influence transmission mechanism.At the same time,unlike previous studies:controlling shareholders with high control are more likely to damage corporate value after equity pledge.This paper shows that controlling shareholders with high control can significantly reduce the risk of stock price crash. |