Equity pledge refers to the shareholder of the stock as a guarantee to obtain funds,because of its simple procedures,low financing cost,generally not easy to dilute,loss of shareholders to the listed company and other advantages of the listed company shareholders favor,become an important financing channel for shareholders.However,its harm cannot be ignored either.It may not only go against the long-term development of enterprises,but even trigger the turmoil of the whole capital market.In this context,it is of great value to study the relationship between controlling shareholder’s equity pledge,information disclosure quality and stock price crash risk for improving the information environment of capital market,standardizing the development of equity pledge business and protecting small investors.Based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and PBC theory,this paper takes listed companies on the main board and small and medium board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2020 as the research object,adopts normative analysis method and empirical analysis method to study the influence of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on stock price crash risk.Furthermore,the mediating effect model is used to study whether the quality of information disclosure can play a mediating role.Finally,the moderating effect of the analyst’s concern is verified.The results show that :1.controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will increase the risk of stock price crash of listed companies.2.The quality of information disclosure plays a mediating role in the impact of equity pledge on the risk of stock price collapse.3.The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge has a weak influence on the risk of stock price crash in the listed companies that are closely watched by securities analysts.On this basis,some specific suggestions are put forward. |