Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge And Stock Price Crash Risk

Equity pledge,as a flexible and convenient way of financing,is becoming more and more common in the increasingly standardized capital market.However,in recent years,"thunder" events of listed companies caused by equity pledge are also common in the market.Based on the above reality,scholars have carried out in-depth research and detailed analysis on a series of derivative topics such as equity pledge behavior and stock price crash risk.The equity pledge of its own shares of listed companies will produce certain influence,the change of specific performance for equity pledge,if the following company’s share price fell to cordon and open line,exchange is likely to be shareholders holding force makes the same score a storehouse,measures are taken,thus cause the stock price to fall further,is not conducive to the stability of the capital market.This paper studies the stock prices of a-share listed companies from 2006 to 2020 as empirical samples.For how to measure equity pledge this variable,focus on the part of the past literature ignores the differences in the listed company equity pledge and the impact on the empirical results,in order to more intuitive to show has pledged equity ratio,this article will be the controlling shareholder equity pledge proportion at the core of research variables,at the same time considering the equity pledge proportion is affected by their own degree of information asymmetry,the samples were grouped according to the degree of information asymmetry for regression analysis.Then to look at as an external oversight role of the securities analyst industry,due to the degree of attention to the different listed companies tracking,an analyst,there exist certain differences in the variable selection process,this article will analyst attention as a moderator variable,check whether it will affect the controlling shareholders equity pledge and the relationship between the stock price crash risk,based on this,we can judge whether the group of securities analysts in the capital market can play a regulatory role.According to the empirical results,first of all,the controlling shareholders with high equity pledge ratio will face greater risk of stock price collapse in the future,especially when the information asymmetry of listed companies is serious,the positive correlation between the two is stronger.Secondly,to some extent,securities analysts can capture the real motivation of controlling shareholders after taking stock pledge,weakening the positive correlation between them.Finally,the samples are grouped according to the characteristics of whether the auditors involved in the annual reports of listed companies work for the Big Four accounting firms,the size of the enterprises themselves and whether they belong to high-tech industry,etc.,and the empirical results are still significant after the grouped tests.This paper not only verifies that under the specific background of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge,securities analysts can play a role in restraining the risk of stock price collapse,but also provides new evidence support for the external supervision and governance effect of analysts from the perspective of information asymmetry.Based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions to the regulatory authorities,securities analysts and market investors.