Research On The Influence Of Controlling Shareholder S Pledge On The Stock Price Crash Risk

Since Shanghai and Shenzhen opened the stock pledge repurchase transaction in May 2013,China's stock pledge has shown an explosive growth.China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited data shows that as of December 28,2018,he total market value of equity pledge in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges is 4.23 trillion yuan,involving 3433 listed companies,accounting for more than 95%of the listed companies,basically forming the situation of the whole market pledge.Although equity pledge alleviates the financing constraints of controlling shareholders and activates the stock assets of financial institutions,it also increases the risk of controlling shareholders' transfer of control rights and enlarges the systemic risk of our capital market,which runs counter to the policy of supervisory authorities to prevent and defuse financial market risks in recent two years.Then,how will the share price of the company change after the pledge of the controlling shareholder's equity?Will controlling shareholders take market value management actions to reduce the risk of stock price collapse based on the motivation of preventing the transfer of control rights?This paper takes the non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2017 for empirical research.Based on behavioral finance theory,information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory,using the method of normative analysis and empirical analysis to investigate the interactive relationship between controlling shareholders'equity pledge and stock price collapse risk,and distinguishes the different effects of pledge continuity on the stock price collapse risk.The results show that:(1)Controlling shareholders'equity pledge is negatively correlated with the risk of stock price collapse.After the pledge,controlling shareholders will adopt a series of market value management actions to reduce the risk of stock price collapse.(2)Non-continuous pledge of equity can not significantly reduce the risk of stock price collapse,while continuous pledge of equity can significantly reduce the risk of stock price collapse.(3)Further considering the impact of property rights,this paper finds that both state-controlled listed companies and non-state-controlled listed companies can significantly reduce the risk of stock price collapse.Further research also finds that the pledge of controlling shareholders' equity is not to improve the company's performance to reduce the risk of stock price collapse,but to regulate the stock price through earnings management.The main body of this paper consists of five chapters.The first chapter is the introduction,which focuses on the research background and significance,research ideas and methods,research characteristics and innovations,and reviews and combs the domestic and foreign research literature on equity pledge and stock price crash risk,so as to lay a theoretical foundation for the follow-up study.The second chapter is the definition of concept and the theoretical basis.The main content is to define the concept of equity pledge,stock price crash and other research objects.On this basis,it elaborates the theoretical basis of this paper from three aspects:behavioral finance theory,information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.Based on the analysis of the institutional background and implementation status of equity pledge,this paper expounds the mechanism of equity pledge on the risk of stock price collapse,and further distinguishes the impact of continuous pledge and non-continuous pledge on the risk of stock price crash.Based on this,the hypothesis of this paper is put forward.The fourth chapter is the empirical analysis.The listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2008-2017 are selected as the research objects.Then,define main variables,descriptive statistics and correlation analysis.Later,empirical analysis and robustness test are conducted by using relevant research models.The fifth chapter is the conclusions,suggestions,research deficiencies and prospects.This chapter mainly summarizes the research conclusions of this paper,and puts forward the targeted countermeasures on the basis of this.At the same time,reflecting on the shortcomings of this paper,so as to lay the foundation for the follow-up research.