Study On Supply Chain Information Sharing And Acquisition Strategy From The Perspective Of Product Quality Decision

With the increasing consumer demand,the strategic decisions of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain are more affected by customer demand information.Therefore,more and more enterprises pay attention to data collection and information analysis technology.Information acquisition refers to the transformation of consumers’ purchase data into product needs through certain ways(self configuring information technology / hiring think tanks / questionnaires).In fact,there are two types of retailers with significantly different competitiveness engaged in business activities: one is a strong retailer with the advantages of cooperation with well-known enterprises,or a strong retailer with regional advantages that has been rooted in the local market for a long time;The other is the relatively weak retailers,who often lack data collection equipment and analysis ability,and need to consider paying a certain cost to obtain market demand information.It is this difference that manufacturers often have concerns when making decisions on product quality level,and the behavior of retailers sharing demand information can provide reference for upstream enterprises to make decisions on product quality to a certain extent.This paper considers a supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and competing retailers,in which the strong retailers make decisions on information sharing strategy,the weak retailers make decisions on information acquisition,the manufacturers make decisions on product quality level and wholesale price,and finally the competing retailers make their respective orders,and the retail end enters the sales competition.Compared with the previous research on the value of information sharing,this thesis innovatively a problem that manufacturer’s quality decision may have an impact on retailer’s incentive of information sharing.This is because some thinking,for example,focusing on what you are good at,or division of labor,encourage firms to outsource non-core business.Hence,it is difficult for the upstream firms to know the aaccurate and precise demand information,which is accordance with the majority of literatures of assumptions.However,in the period of product development and production,it is significant for the manufacturer to utilize consumer’s demand bias to decide product quality level.Once,there is asversely influence on payoff at this sale season if misleading decisions is made.Based on the aforementioned discussion,we study retailer’s information sharing strategy in a supply chain with manufacturer’s quality decision.The conclusions could be listed as followed.(1)Under the unified pricing model,due to the "free ride effect",the game result between retailers is related to the decision-making order.This paper finds that under the situation of giving priority to the implementation of information sharing decision,vulnerable retailers have an observation field of vision,so they can perfectly infer the real market demand through the wholesale price,and the "free ride effect" has become a factor hindering information sharing.In the situation of giving priority to the implementation of information acquisition decision,vulnerable retailers may pay a certain cost to obtain market demand information under certain conditions in order to grasp sales opportunities.At this time,the motivation of information sharing is related to the manufacturer’s cost efficiency and the competitive intensity of the retail end.(2)Under the differentiated pricing mode,the "free ride effect" fails,and retailers enter the signal game.This paper finds that when the weak retailer decides not to obtain demand information,the strong retailer will distort the order quantity in order to maintain its market share,so as to achieve the misleading effect and trigger the signal game;When weak retailers choose to obtain demand information,the retail end realizes information transparency,and the decision-making efficiency and competition intensity of manufacturers are closely related to the motivation of information sharing.