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Research On Information Sharing Mode And Incentive Mechanism Of Fresh Produce Supply Chain

Posted on:2022-07-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H XuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306350966399Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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In 2019,China’s total output of agricultural products was 1.98 billion tons,of which the output of fresh agricultural products exceeded 1.1 billion tons,and the output value of fresh agricultural products was about 7 trillion yuan(primary agricultural products).If fresh processing,storage,and circulation were taken into account,the total market transaction volume exceeded 2 billion yuan.With the continuous development of China’s economy and the improvement of living standards,China’s structural oversupply pushes fresh agricultural products to the buyer’s market,and market demand is calling for a better supply chain operation system.All along,information asymmetry is one of the obstacles to the efficient operation of fresh produce supply chain.The loss rate of fresh products that cannot be sold in time is much higher than the average loss rate of developed countries due to the problems of unclear supply and demand information,low degree of cold chain logistics informatization and asymmetric information.In order to control the loss,more and more advanced preservation technology and information technology are applied to fresh agricultural products supply chain.Therefore,this paper studies the characteristics of the existing fresh agricultural products supply chain in China,and its information sharing mode with the method of game theory.Finally this paper discusses the incentive situation of government participation in information sharing based on the principal-agent theory.First of all,this article analyzes the information sharing behavior of the three main modes of the fresh produce supply chain.By using the method of complete information static game to study the characteristics of information sharing under these three modes.This paper establishes a game model,explores the factors hindering the efficient information sharing,and gives the operational countermeasures and suggestions to the participants in different modes.At present,according to the main channels through which fresh agricultural products can be obtained in the market,the supply chain circulation mode can be divided into three types:"wholesale" model with wholesalers as the main body,"leading enterprises" model with leading enterprises as the main body,and the "Farmersupermarket Direct-purchase" model for supermarkets as the mainstay.In the "wholesale"model,it is particularly necessary to provide guidance to farmers on popular science and information and dispatch professional staff to teach information technology.This can enable farmers to more actively seek information from wholesalers in the information sharing game,so as to protect their own interests from being infringed.In the "leading enterprises" model,due to the large volume of leading enterprises,it is necessary to use information management platform for more efficient information sharing.In the "FarmerSupermarket Direct-Purchase" model,we can establish an effective contract and coordination mechanism to distribute the results fairly,so as to avoid internal friction in direct procurement,so that both sides can learn from each other’s strong points and maximize the system benefits.Secondly,this article uses the evolutionary game method to study the dynamic evolution process of information sharing between upstream and downstream enterprises in the fresh produce supply chain from the perspective of bounded rationality,and explores the evolution law of the information sharing strategy of supply chain enterprises.This article also discusses the information sharing behaviors between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain of a secondary agricultural product supply chain.By analyzing the characteristics of upstream and downstream enterprises,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers,uses numerical analysis to analyze the influence of different parameters on the evolution,and studies the evolution path in different cases.How to measure the benefits and losses it brings is an aspect that upstream and downstream companies attach great importance to.The benefits and losses brought about by information sharing behavior will also adversely affect the information sharing behavior of upstream and downstream companies.Through mathematical modeling and numerical models,it can be known that the greater the difference between the benefits obtained through information sharing and the cost of building an information system,the greater the probability of upstream and downstream enterprises participating in information sharing.When the proportion of "freeriding" gains is smaller,the proportion of gains from participating in construction is larger,and the loss of information leakage caused by information sharing behavior is smaller,and the possibility of enterprises for information sharing is greater.Finally,this article further considers the government’s participation in encouraging enterprise information sharing,and explores the influence of incentive contracts on upstream and downstream enterprises’ participation in information sharing behavior.This chapter assumes that the government is the principal and the enterprise in the fresh produce supply chain is the agent.A multi-stage decision-making principal-agent model of multiple agents between the two is established,considering the two different situations of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Relations with the three agents of competition,cooperation,and independence,this article establishes an incentive model,and performes numerical simulation and analysis.When the information stock and knowledge transfer coefficient of the fresh agricultural product supply chain enterprises are larger,and the cost and risk of information sharing are greater,the government can increase the intensity of incentives to increase the effort of the supply chain enterprises in information sharing.Participating in the competition and cooperation between enterprises can encourage supply chain enterprises to make more information sharing efforts to a certain extent.The government can encourage fair competition and information cooperation among enterprises,so as to improve the efficiency of the whole fresh produce supply chain.
Keywords/Search Tags:fresh produce supply chain, information sharing, complete information static game, evolutionary game, principal-agent theory
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