With the deepening of China’s aging population,the development of the senior care service supply chain has become an important means to increase the supply of social senior care services in China and to address the aging of China’s population and the miniaturization of family structure.However,due to the long payback period and high risk of investment in senior care service quality,members of the supply chain have the motive to seek for other members to invest in service quality while they share the profits brought by service quality improvement,which hinders the sustainable and stable improvement of senior care service quality.Therefore,it is important to investigate the service quality investment mechanism and its evolution law of the senior care service supply chain,and to improve the willingness of service quality investment in the senior care service supply chain,in order to promote the healthy development of the senior care service supply chain and enhance the effective supply of social senior care services.In view of this,this paper explores the mechanism of service quality input decision and its evolutionary process in the senior care service supply chain by constructing Stackelberg game and evolutionary game models,and further uses MATLAB software to conduct numerical simulation to visually explain the evolutionary law of both parties’ strategies and their influencing factors.The research results show that the service quality input has an effect on the price,service quality and profit of the senior care service supply chain,and the integrator’s active service quality input has a better effect on the service quality and profit of the supply chain;the initial willingness of the provider and the integrator have different degrees of influence on the willingness of both parties to invest in service quality,when the initial willingness of the provider is stronger,the integrator is more likely to be influenced by the initial willingness of the provider.When the provider’s initial willingness is stronger,the integrator is more likely to be influenced by the provider’s initial willingness,and when the integrator’s initial willingness is stronger,the provider is more likely to be influenced by the integrator’s initial willingness.and cost-sharing coefficients have a greater impact on the integrator’s strategy choice.Based on the above analysis,this paper puts forward suggestions for strengthening service quality inputs in the senior care service supply chain,in order to promote the high-quality development of the senior care service supply chain and increase the effective supply of high-quality social senior care services. |