| Today,with the increasing emphasis on environmental protection,the carbon restraint policy represented by carbon cap-and-trade has attracted more and more attention.As the main mode of transportation in the transportation industry,highway transport has huge carbon emissions that cannot be ignored.In the context of carbon emissions peak and carbon neutrality,as an intensive and efficient transportation organization mode,rail-road intermodal transport can effectively realize the complementary advantages of highway transport and railway transport.It has obtained greater development space because of its characteristics of high resource utilization,green and low-carbon and flexible transportation mode.Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China also proposed in the "14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Green Transportation" : continuously optimize and adjust the transportation structure and promote the "highway to rail" transport of bulk goods and medium and long distance goods.The implementation of carbon cap-and-trade policy can play an important role in achieving the goal of energy conservation and emission reduction in the transportation industry.Taking the single highway enterprise and rail-road intermodal transport logistics service supply chain composed of single highway and railway enterprise as the research object,this paper studies the game between the government and relevant enterprises with carbon cap as the decision variable under the carbon cap-and-trade policy.By constructing the game between government and highway enterprise,the game between government and decentralized decision-making,centralized decision-making of the highway and railway enterprises models,and using the Stackelberg game to obtain the equilibrium solutions of each model,this paper mainly analyzes the impact of game between government and enterprises on the decision-making of relevant enterprises in different models under carbon cap-and-trade policy,and the relationship between relevant parameters and the optimal decision-making and equilibrium profit of highway and railway enterprises in low-carbon environment,and design the revenue sharing contract and profit redistribution coordination mechanism to realize the coordination of rail-road intermodal transport logistics service supply chain.Finally,specific values are given to verify the influence of the conclusions and relevant parameters on the equilibrium solutions.It is found that under the carbon cap-and-trade policy,the supply chain equilibrium profit and social welfare of the game between government and centralized decision-making of the highway and railway enterprises are the best compared with other models.At the same time,it is found that the carbon trading price is negatively correlated with the equilibrium profits of highway and railway enterprises;The proportion of rail-road intermodal transport is positively correlated with the equilibrium profits of highway and railway enterprises;When the carbon trading price meets a certain range and the railway proportion in the rail-road intermodal transport is greater than a certain value,the rail-road intermodal transport mode is more valuable than the single highway transport mode;Finally,the value ranges of the coordination mechanism parameters of revenue sharing contract and profit redistribution are obtained respectively,which proves that the two coordination methods can realize the coordination of highway railway intermodal logistics service supply chain. |
