The Impact Of Central Environmental Protection Inspector On Air Quality

Since the reform and opening up,China’s rapid economic development has been accompanied by serious environmental issues.Since the 18 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,China has paid more attention to environmental protection issues.The report of the 20 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that: Deeply promote the central ecological and environmental protection supervision.Since the central environmental protection supervision policy was piloted in Hebei in 2016,it has still been implemented in different regions of the country in batches,and the central environmental protection supervision system as a means of tackling environmental pollution issues in China The important institutional design for achieving the ultimate goal of both promoting economic development and protecting the environment deserves attention for its policy effectiveness.In order to study the role of central environmental supervision in controlling air pollution and improving air quality,at the theoretical level,this thesis analyzes the possible factors that affect the implementation effect of central environmental supervision policies;At the empirical level,this article uses the breakpoint regression method to conduct an empirical study on the implementation effect of central environmental supervision,exploring the impact of the central environmental supervision system on air quality.At the same time,establish a tripartite evolutionary game model for local governments,central environmental supervision departments,and enterprises,and combine numerical simulation to study the internal mechanism of the impact of central environmental supervision policies on air quality and whether there is a deterrent effect.The research results show that the central environmental protection inspector can influence the behavior of other game players by increasing the intensity of punishment(economic and political punishment),thereby reducing pollution.However,the increase in the intensity of punishment is limited.When exceeding a certain limit,the three-party evolutionary game will not be in a stable state and cannot achieve the expected results.At the same time,empirical analysis was conducted using air quality related data from 289 cities nationwide from 2015 to 2019,and it was found that both the first round of inspections and the first batch of "looking back" significantly reduced AQI,PM2.5,and PM10.To a large extent,central environmental protection inspections have played a role in reducing the air quality index,and have a positive impact on air quality.However,there are certain differences in the results presented by each batch of inspected areas,The pilot effect is significant,while the effects of the second and third batches of policies are relatively weak.The policy effect of "looking back" by the central environmental protection inspector has an early effect,resulting in a less significant effect than the second batch at the time of entry.In heterogeneity analysis,it was found that areas with higher industrial levels have a more significant effect of central environmental protection inspections than areas with lower industrial levels.In mechanism testing,it was found that the hypothesis proposed in the theoretical aspect can be verified by adding variables related to economic and political penalties.