Research On The Influence Mechanism And Effect Evaluation Of Environmental Regulation On Enterprise Green Innovation From The Perspective Of Innovation Motivation

As the world’s largest developing country in terms of carbon emissions,China has actively assumed international responsibilities and set the goal of peaking greenhouse gases before 2030 and striving to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060,which called the “dual carbon” goal.however,the time is tight and the task is heavy for China to achieve the goal of "dual carbon",and it is urgent for enterprises to play an important role as market players.Green innovation is the primary way to reduce carbon emissions,so the green innovation behavior of enterprises plays a pivotal role in the realization of the "dual carbon" goal.The unique positive externalities of innovation knowledge and negative externalities of environment in green innovation behavior make it difficult for enterprises to invest limited funds in green innovation with long income cycle and uncertain income.Therefore,under the constraints of government environmental regulations,enterprises based on different innovation motives will choose different green innovation behaviors,namely strategic green innovation and substantive green innovation.In view of this,this thesis explores the mechanism and effect of environmental regulation on enterprise green innovation from the perspective of heterogeneous innovation motivation.Firstly,the thesis systematically analyzes the evolving characteristics of China’s environmental policies and further analyzes the current situation of China’s environmental regulations and enterprises’ green innovation.The results show that the importance of market mechanism and public participation is increasingly emphasized in the evolution process of China’s environmental regulation.Although the investment level of environmental pollution control in China is on the rise,there is still a certain regional heterogeneity.The level of green innovation of enterprises shows an overall growth trend,but the growth rate is slow,and the number of green utility model patents is always higher than that of green invention patents,which indicates the existence of strategic green innovation behavior of enterprises.Secondly,this thesis establishes a theoretical framework for the impact of environmental regulation on enterprise green innovation,and explores the influence mechanism of environmental regulation on enterprise green innovation by constructing the evolutionary game model of government,enterprise and public.The results show that the phenomenon of "innovation worship" in local governments and the political attribute of subsidy funds are the main factors leading to the government’s lax environmental regulation and enterprises’ strategic green innovation.Only when the government strictly regulates and grants some green innovation subsidies to enterprises,enterprises will choose substantive green innovation strategies.The government’s public environmental publicity is a key factor to motivate the public to choose the supervision strategy.Meanwhile,the public supervision can promote the government’s strict environmental regulation and the substantial green innovation of enterprises.Thirdly,on the basis of the tripartite evolutionary game model established above,this paper further uses system dynamics for numerical simulation to clarify the influence of parameter changes on the strategy selection of each agent and the final stable state of the system.The results show that,although the government’s appropriate rewards and punishments for enterprises’ environmental behavior will encourage enterprises to carry out substantive green innovation,excessive green innovation subsidies will increase the government’s financial burden,make the government’s strategy choice deviate from the stable state,and thus affect the implementation of government environmental regulations.At the same time,public supervision plays an important role in promoting strict environmental regulation of the government and substantive green innovation of enterprises.However,when the government’s environmental publicity is low,the public tends to choose the strategy of nonsupervision or fall into the fluctuation of strategy selection.Finally,this thesis takes the carbon emission trading policy as the quasinatural experiment to empirically test the actual effect of environmental regulation on enterprises’ green innovation behavior.The results show that the carbon emission trading policy can promote substantial green innovation and strategic green innovation by increasing the cost pressure and expected income of enterprises.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the carbon emission trading policy can promote the substantial green innovation and strategic green innovation behavior of state-owned enterprises,but has no effect on the strategic green innovation behavior of non-state-owned enterprises.At the same time,the carbon emission trading policy can only promote the green innovation behavior of enterprises in heavily polluting industries,but has no significant effect on enterprises in non-heavily polluting industries.The thesis has a total of 39 pictures,17 tables,and 139 references.