Analysis Of Green Technology Innovation Decision Of Cluster Enterprises Under Government Incentives And Constraints

Regarding the problems of isolated and fragmented innovation elements,low synergy among collaborative innovation entities,and insufficient initiative in China’s green technology innovation system,the current lack of motivation for enterprise green technology innovation and the imbalance in collaboration between innovation entities have resulted in difficulties in achieving the value goals of collaborative green technology innovation.Based on the evolutionary game theory,complex network diffusion theory,and collaborative innovation theory,this paper first constructs a three-stage evolutionary game model of green technology innovation diffusion under government incentives,consisting of evolutionary game models,evolutionary rules,and network structures.It explores the dynamic adjustment process of cluster enterprises and market consumers adopting green technology innovation strategies under the coordination and complementary effects of policy and market mechanisms.It analyzes the adoption behaviors of cluster enterprises and consumers regarding green technology innovation and the optimal boundaries of government incentive policies under specific conditions.Subsequently,the relevant entities involved in the flow,transformation,and value-added activities of collaborative green technology innovation knowledge and technology are connected to form a cluster innovation chain.This enables a virtuous interaction of interests between enterprises and the market,establishing an evolutionary game model of collaborative green technology innovation led by the chain-leading enterprises,with collaborative participation from research institutions and chain-affiliated enterprises.The paper explores the influence mechanisms of internal and external factors on the decision-making behavior of green innovation entities.It extends to the demand side of the cluster innovation chain and analyzes the evolutionary impact of government regulatory constraints on the production of green innovative products by cluster enterprises and consumer consumption behavior.The main conclusions in this paper are obtained as follows:(1)The critical threshold for the maturity of green technologies and external economic subsidy incentives to promote the diffusion of green innovative technologies among peripheral enterprises in the cluster is higher than that among core enterprises.Increasing the number of green technology innovation enterprises in the cluster significantly promotes the diffusion of green innovative technologies among core enterprises.(2)Government economic subsidy incentives for the diffusion of green technology innovation need to reach an effective subsidy threshold to be effective.The optimal incentive subsidy thresholds at the enterprise and market ends are influenced by the cluster organizational structure and the number of green innovation enterprises,and they are higher than the thresholds after which the incentive effectiveness exhibits diminishing marginal returns.(3)The stability of green technology innovation diffusion is influenced by the diffusion network structure,and the heterogeneity of the network structure during the diffusion process leads to variations in the negative externalities affecting diffusion stability.Reducing the R&D costs of green innovative technologies or the prices of green innovative products is crucial for stable green technology innovation diffusion.(4)The government plays a role in both incentive promotion and regulatory supervision in the decision-making processes of collaborative green technology innovation and the production of green innovative products by cluster enterprises.This helps maintain the stability of the collaborative green technology innovation system and ensures the quality of green innovative products.(5)The sharing of innovation costs and risks among collaborative green technology innovation entities contributes to improving the efficiency of collaborative green technology innovation.The cost-sharing by a single entity,if too high or too low,affects the evolutionary stability of the collaborative green technology innovation system.In the collaborative green technology innovation system,research institutions play a more important role as collaborative innovation entities compared to chain-affiliated enterprises,and they exhibit higher levels of initiative.(6)The market demand for green innovative products follows the principle of price competition,and market price,product quality,and green usage benefits are key factors influencing consumer purchases.Consumers have a preference for green innovative products and can be targeted by green innovation enterprises to seek higher profits.Active government regulatory policies are fundamental in safeguarding consumer rights and interests.