Research On The Optimization Of Strategic Behaviors Of Related Subjects Of Local Environmental Governance Under The Vertical Management System

In 2016,the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued the "Guiding Opinions on the Pilot Reform of the Vertical Management System for Monitoring,Supervision and Law Enforcement of Environmental Protection Agencies Below Provincial Levels",various provinces and cities have actively implemented reform implementation plans suitable for all provinces and cities.By now,the reform of the vertical management system of environmental protection institutions below the provincial level has been basically completed,and the operation of the vertical management system of environmental monitoring,supervision and law enforcement is advancing in an orderly manner.According to various environmental monitoring data in the "2020 China Ecological Environment Bulletin",the quality of China’s ecological environment has been improved on the whole,but ecological environmental protection is still facing a severe situation,and there are still some practical problems in local environmental governance under the vertical management system Need to be resolved.Under the vertical management system,incorporating the relevant subjects of local environmental governance into a framework for research has important theoretical and practical significance for optimizing the strategic behavior of each subject and solving the economic,environmental and social problems arising from the conflict of interests of the subjects.Firstly,sort out the research results of local environmental governance of vertical management systems at home and abroad,define the concepts of vertical management and local environmental governance,and use flat organization theory and game theory to construct the context of the article.Secondly,it analyzes the behavioral characteristics of the subjects related to local environmental governance under the vertical management system,clarifies the interaction between subjects and the interactive dilemma,and lays the foundation for the construction of the game model.Thirdly,it conducts game and empirical analysis on the strategic behaviors among relevant subjects of local environmental governance.Select local governments,municipal ecological and environmental bureaus,municipal monitoring centers,and enterprises as the main players of the game,build a game model from the strategic behavior of the game player and analyze the evolutionary stability strategy,and select the data assignment parameters of Xingtai City and Chongqing City for simulation analysis.Finally,in response to the predicament of the interaction between the relevant entities of local environmental governance,suggestions for path optimization are proposed from three aspects:mitigating indirect interference from local governments,solving the dual leadership dilemma of the municipal ecological environment bureau’s law enforcement,build and improve an effective mechanism to prevent collusion between government and enterprises.The study found that in order to reduce the indirect interference of the local government,it is first necessary to clearly divide the environmental protection responsibilities of the local government and the monitoring center in the city.The dual leadership dilemma of the local ecological environment bureau requires not only to refine the environmental protection responsibilities of the local government and the local ecological environment bureau,but also to increase the assessment coefficient and reward for the local ecological environment bureau,but the strategic tendencies of the local government must be considered.Under the influence of government-enterprise collusion,local governments and local environmental protection agencies both tend to collude and respectively tend to collude,and the impact of parameter changes on the strategy of achieving evolutionary stability is different.Measures such as reducing the cost of environmental monitoring law enforcement,improving the strictness of environmental monitoring,increasing the penalties for local governments and environmental protection institutions,and increasing the assessment and reward of monitoring centers in the city are conducive to the realization of the ideal evolution and stability strategy.However,when the preference choice of various institutions is not clear,it is necessary to carefully use the measures of increasing the assessing and rewarding local ecological and environmental bureaus.