Research On CSR And Low Carbon Supply Chain Decision-Making And Coordination With Different Behavioral Preferences Under The Guidance Of Platform

The gas emission from agriculture accounts for about one sixth of the total greenhouse gas.Therefore,in order to achieve the goal of carbon neutralization and carbon peak,low-carbon agriculture is the best path for agricultural development.Therefore,this paper studies the production decision-making of low-carbon agriculture and explores some problems in the supply chain management of low-carbon agriculture,so as to provide theoretical reference value for the achievement of "double carbon" goal and the development of low-carbon agriculture in China.Firstly,this paper constructs a two-level low-carbon agricultural supply chain composed of low-carbon farmers and e-commerce platform,introduces consumers’ traceability preference into the demand function,constructs four decision-making models: fairness and neutrality of supply chain members,farmers’ concern about fairness,platform implementation of corporate social responsibility(CSR)and farmers’ concern about fairness and platform implementation of CSR,and explores environmental protection awareness,traceability preference The impact of equity concern coefficient and CSR level of platform implementation on low-carbon supply chain decision-making.Secondly,based on the background of government subsidies,this paper reconstructs the game model of low-carbon agricultural supply chain,continues to explore the impact of platform CSR on low-carbon supply chain decision-making,introduces reciprocity preference,constructs three decision-making models: platform implementation CSR under government subsidies,platform implementation CSR under government subsidies and farmers have reciprocity preference,and platform implementation CSR under government subsidies and platforms have reciprocity preference,and obtains the optimal decision-making model through comparative analysis,The optimal decision model is coordinated by bipartite contract.The corresponding conclusions of the above game research are as follows:(1)improving consumers’ awareness of environmental protection is not only conducive to improving supply chain profits,but also reducing carbon emissions of low-carbon agricultural products and improving consumers’ traceability preference;(2)Leaders should pay attention to the profits of their followers and improve their own interests.At the same time,they should also improve the interests of their followers to avoid their fair concern behavior,which will lead to the increase of carbon emissions of low-carbon agricultural products and the decline of supply chain profits;(3)The corporate social responsibility of the platform can improve the efficiency of government subsidies,reduce the carbon emissions of low-carbon agricultural products and government financial expenditure,and improve the profits of low-carbon supply chain,but the implementation level of CSR of the platform should be within a certain range;(4)The reciprocal preference of the platform is conducive to the development of low-carbon supply chain.With the increase of reciprocal preference,the carbon emission of low-carbon agricultural products is reduced,the government subsidy expenditure is reduced,and the profit and social welfare of low-carbon supply chain are increased.The two-part pricing contract can realize the contract coordination of the optimal decision-making mode(that is,the platform implements CSR under government subsidy and the platform has reciprocal preference).