Research On Sustainable Supply Chain Contract Coordination Under Carbon Tax Policy Considering Consumer Preference

As a glo bal problem,greenhouse effect has received wide attentio n.Governments around the world have issued various regulat ions to control carbon emissio n in production in recent years,for which carbon tax has proven to be more effect ive in abatement than other regulat ions.In addit io n to increased incent ives fro m carbon tax po lic y,growing consumer environmental aware ness(CEA)is making consumers more willing to pay high prices for green products.Under such circumstances,co mpanies need to reduce their carbon emissio n in reactio n to new consumer preferences as well as governmental regulat ions.However,invest ing in green techno logy is often cost ly,making co mpanies bear heavy burden.Therefore,sustainable supply chain coordinat ion under carbon regulat io ns considering CEA is beco ming an important issue.In addit io n,due to econo mic integrat ion,disrupt ions are commo n in supply chain.Disrupt ion management is important.This study focus on the coordinat ion of a sustainable supply chain consist ing of a manufacturer and a retailer under carbon tax policy.Considering consumer environmental awareness,this study first compares who lesale price contract,revenue-sharing contract,cost-sharing contract and two-part tariff contract,and finds that none o f them can o btain coordinat ion.We also analyze the relat io nship between optimal decisio ns and vital parameters.Then,“Adjusted” contracts are introduced and proved that only adjusted revenue-sharing contract(ARS)can coordinate the supply chain.Considering the profit redistribut ion proposit ion o f the two-part tariff contract,the study introduce s co mbined contracts: adjusted who lesale price co mbined wit h two-part tariff contract(AWP+TPT)and adjusted green cost-sharing co mbined wit h two-part tariff contract(AGCS+TPT),which are found capable o f obtaining supply chain coordinat ion.In the last part,this paper presents dynamic coordinat ion mechanism dealing wit h disrupt ions of market size as well as manufacturer’s production cost and retailer sales cost.