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Research On Supply Chain Coordination Based On Consumer Preferences Under Carbon Constraints

Posted on:2024-03-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S RenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2531306932959869Subject:Transportation planning and management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,China’s carbon emission trading market has gained unprecedented development,and the development of carbon trading mechanism has entered a new stage.Consumers’ consumption concept has also gradually changed from being affordable to low-carbon and environmentally friendly.The production and transportation of enterprises have been included in the scope of carbon footprint.In this context,how to achieve both low-carbon and environmental protection and maximize their own profits has become a new problem facing the development of enterprises today.Although the market demand for low-carbon products is high,the production cost of products will also rise,so some enterprises are not willing to invest too much in low-carbon emission reduction,resulting in the total benefit of the supply chain is not optimal.A reasonable supply chain contract can regulate the conflict of benefits between supply chain members and the supply chain as a whole,improve the efficiency of the supply chain,and make the supply chain coordinated.In this paper,we consider the influence of sales effort and carbon emission on demand,study the supply chain coordination under the demand stochastic and deterministic conditions respectively,and design a reasonable combination contract to achieve supply chain coordination.The specific work of this paper is as follows:First of all,the global carbon emissions remain high,and this paper starts from the real situation.The current situation of domestic and foreign research is analyzed,the content of this paper is determined,and the technical line of research is formulated.The theory of carbon allowance trading mechanism,Stackleberg game theory and supply chain contract coordination theory are introduced,and the solution method of Stackleberg game model is mastered,and the wholesale price discount contract,cost sharing contract and repurchase contract are taken as the basis for designing the combination contract.Again,this paper investigates the supply chain contract coordination problem under market demand determination by taking a secondary supply chain composed of retailers and production suppliers as the research object.Under the government’s carbon quota trading policy,the profit model of each enterprise in the supply chain is constructed based on the Stackleberg game theory,considering the influence of carbon emissions and sales effort on market demand,and the optimal decision under different decision modes is solved with the supplier as the dominant player.By comparing and analyzing the decision results of the two models,a combination contract of "wholesale price discount + carbon cost sharing" is designed to realize the coordination of the supply chain.Then,this paper also considers the situation when product transportation is outsourced,introduces third-party transportation companies,and investigates the pricing problem of transportation companies.Under the condition of supply chain coordination,the profit model of transportation enterprises is constructed to determine the transportation pricing decisions of transportation enterprises.Finally,the validity and reasonableness of the design deed are verified through numerical analysis,and the impact of changes in relevant parameters on the decision of each enterprise in the supply chain is analyzed.Finally,the contract coordination problem of the supply chain in the case of stochastic market demand is studied.Consumers are divided into two groups,general consumers and low-carbon consumers,based on their low-carbon consumption preferences,and different compacts are designed for different consumer groups.It is found that when the retailer is the leader in the Stackleberg game,the buyback contract can achieve supply chain coordination for the general consumer group.This paper designs a combination contract of "carbon emission reduction cost sharing + buyback" on the basis of buyback contract.The results show that the contract designed in this paper can coordinate the supply chain for different consumer groups,which further verifies the effectiveness and rationality of the contract.
Keywords/Search Tags:Supply Chain Coordination, Carbon Quota Trading, Stackleberg Game, Low-Carbon Preference, Sales Effort
PDF Full Text Request
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