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Research On The Interest Game And Interest Coordination Of Standards Essential Patent Related Entities

Posted on:2024-07-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J X ZhengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2530307154498584Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the development of technology and the deepening of global connectivity,the model of standard essential patents leading development has shown superiority.In order to compete for the dominance of international standards,countries around the world have formulated standardization strategies to promote the development of standard essential patents,in order to cope with the increasingly complex market competition situation and pursue economic benefits.However,the inherent opposition between public and private rights in standard essential patents has led to conflicts of interest between patent owners and patent implementers.The actions of both parties to maximize their own interests and harm the interests of the other party have hindered the development of standard essential patents.Therefore,in the context of standardization strategy,clarifying the conflict of interests between patent owners and patent implementers and conducting effective interest coordination is of great significance for promoting the development of essential patents for standards and improving their competitiveness.This article aims to promote the development of standard essential patents,with patentees and patent implementers directly related to the development of standard essential patents as the research object.Focusing on the idea of "conflict of interests-interest game-interest coordination-development strategies",it deeply explores the impact of interest interaction between the two parties on the development of standard essential patents,and how to coordinate the interests of both parties to promote the development of standard essential patents.Specifically,starting from analyzing the conflict of interests between the two parties involved in patent licensing,various game analysis methods are used to conduct research on the game of interests between the two parties involved in the formation of standard essential patents,and the coordination of interests between the two parties involved in the implementation of standard essential patents.Finally,countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to promote the development of standard essential patents.The main research content includes:(1)Analysis of conflicts of interest among stakeholders related to standard essential patents.Based on the inherent conflicts between public and private rights in standard essential patents,as well as the looseness of the FRAND principle,this thesis analyzes the behavioral choices that cause conflicts of interest between both parties in the development of standard essential patents and the impact of these conflicts on the development of standard essential patents.It is found that balancing the interests of both parties is the key to promoting the development of standard essential patents.(2)Research on the Game Theory of Subject Interests in the Formation of Standard Essential Patents.Based on the impact of the interaction between the interests of both parties involved in the implementation of patent licensing on the formation of standard essential patents,and taking into account factors such as the willingness of both parties to participate,standardized income distribution,and satisfaction between both parties,an evolutionary game model of the interaction between the interests of both parties is constructed.Research has found that in order to achieve the strategy of developing standard essential patents,it is crucial to promote reasonable pricing of standard essential patents to balance the standardized income distribution between both parties.(3)Research on the coordination of subject interests in the implementation of standard essential patents.Based on the importance of reasonable pricing of standard essential patents for balancing the interests of both parties and promoting the development of standard essential patents,a license pricing model is constructed in various situations,and an interest coordination mechanism is designed to achieve reasonable pricing of standard essential patents and coordination of interests between both parties,which is conducive to resolving conflicts of interests between both parties and promoting the development of standard essential patents.(4)Research on the development strategies of standard essential patents.Based on the previous research conclusions,in the process of forming and implementing standard essential patents,countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to promote the development of standard essential patents from multiple dimensions such as patent owners,patent implementers,and other relevant entities.
Keywords/Search Tags:Standard essential patents, Interest game, Interest coordination, FRAND principle
PDF Full Text Request
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