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The Interest Game Among The Participants In Rural Land Transfer

Posted on:2021-03-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2370330611960892Subject:Public administration
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Land,as a kind of resource,is the material carrier for the majority of farmers to ensure their basic life.As a factor of production,it is an indispensable means of production for farmers to develop production.It integrates the two functions of farmers' survival and development.With the promotion of Rural Revitalization Strategy and the further deepening of land system reform in China,rural land circulation has become more active.As the participants of rural land transfer,what position will the grass-roots government,land inflow party and land outflow party appeal for the transfer of rural land use right? What strategies will each choose to promote or restrict land transfer? What are the crux of the problems in the process of land transfer? What will be the result of the final interest game of all interested parties?Based on this,this paper takes Liushahe Town,Ningxiang City,Hunan Province as the case area,summarizes the current situation of rural land transfer in this town,and through a large number of questionnaires and field interviews,analyzes the interest game of spontaneous rural land transfer,rural land transfer with the participation of grass-roots government and rural land transfer under the supervision of grass-roots government,and draws the following conclusions:There are some problems in the circulation of rural land in Liushahe Town,such as the low desire of circulation,the dislocation of the implementation subject,the confusion of circulation behavior,the out of control result of circulation,and the imperfection of circulation market.Then,the game theory is introduced,which is divided into three categories: spontaneous rural land transfer,rural land transfer under the direct participation of the grass-roots government and rural land transfer under the supervision of the grass-roots government.The game model between the participants in the process of rural land transfer is established respectively,and the benefit game between the participants in the rural land transfer is analyzed in-depth,and the relevant conclusions are drawn,which reveals that The main causes of the problems in the rural land circulation of Liushahe town are insufficient ideological emancipation,incomplete security system,unclear property rights of rural land,confusion of management and service of grass-roots government,lagging supervision of the results of rural land circulation,and unsmooth operation mechanism of rural land circulation.On this basis,it is proposed to realize and ensure the sustainable and healthy rural land circulation of Liushahe town The countermeasures and suggestions are as follows: the grass-roots government should give full play to the leading role in promoting the operation of rural land circulation,guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of both sides of the circulation,stimulate the desire of land circulation,clarify the property rights of rural land,protect the farmers' autonomous rights,optimize the management and service of rural land circulation,strengthen the supervision of rural land circulation,and improve the health of rural land Healthy and orderly circulation mechanism system;as the inflow and outflow Party of rural land,it should play the main role in the process of rural land circulation,strengthen ideological emancipation,strengthen the spirit of contract,follow the rural land circulation agreement,consciously strengthen the self supervision of rural land circulation,so as to jointly promote the healthy and sustainable operation of rural land circulation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Rural land circulation, Game theory, Interest body
PDF Full Text Request
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