Evolutionary Game Analysis On The Supervision Of False Publicity Of Live Streaming E-commerce Under The Multi-subject Participation

With the rapid development of Internet technology,the new commodity sales model of "live streaming + e-commerce" emerges at the right moment.E-commerce live streaming has the advantages of high convenience,strong interaction and wide spread,which promotes the rapid development of e-commerce industry.However,there are many problems in the process of the vigorous development of e-commerce live streaming,among which the false publicity of e-commerce live streaming cannot be ignored,which not only damages the rights and interests of consumers,but also has a negative impact on the order and development of the e-commerce live streaming industry.In this context,the study on the supervision of e-commerce live streaming false publicity behavior has strong practical significance.Therefore,this paper uses the evolutionary game model to study the game relationship among multiple participants from the perspective of the improvement of e-commerce live broadcast false publicity behavior and its supervision status.First of all,considering the situation that consumers take advantage of the platform to supervise the false publicity behavior of live streaming e-commerce through data feedback,this paper discusses the supervision of live streaming e-commerce false publicity with the participation of consumers,and analyzes the stable strategy combination among the game players by constructing a three-party evolutionary game model among live streaming delivery platform,consumers and platform merchants,and carries out simulation analysis.The research shows that: based on the motivation of platform merchants,platform merchants falsely advertise for obtaining excess earnings,and this behavior is affected by the incentive of live streaming delivery platform,punishment of platform and consumers,and reputation gain or loss.Based on the motivation of consumers’ participation in supervision,consumers’ participation in the supervision of false publicity of e-commerce live streaming can reduce the degree of information asymmetry in the supervision of e-commerce live streaming.The decision-making of consumers’ participation in supervision is affected by incentive factors,cost of rights protection and compensation.Based on the control of live streaming platform,when the profit of false publicity is low,there is no need for the platform to invest enough cost for supervision,and the adoption of loose supervision can reduce the occurrence of false publicity.When the profit of false publicity is too high,any regulatory strategy will be ineffective against the false publicity of e-commerce live streaming.The platform will formulate reasonable incentives,penalties and compensation quotas.So that platform merchants do not have enough motivation to carry out false propaganda.Secondly,considering the situation of collusion between live streaming delivery platform and platform merchants in the supervision process of false publicity of live streaming delivery,based on the perspective of government regulation,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government regulatory agencies and live streaming delivery platform under different reward and punishment mechanisms,analyzes the stability of equilibrium points in the system,and conducts simulation analysis.The results show that there is no stable strategy under static reward and punishment mechanism and dynamic reward and static punishment mechanism.Static reward dynamic punishment and dynamic reward dynamic punishment mechanism,the system has a stable equilibrium point;Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,the probability of collusion between the live delivery platform and the platform merchants is lower.Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,when the punishment intensity increases,the probability of collusion between the live streaming platform and the platform merchants will decrease,and the government supervision cost will decrease accordingly.When the reward intensity increases,the probability of strict supervision by the government decreases,and the probability of collusion between live streaming delivery platform and platform merchants decreases but changes little.Therefore,the scientific and reasonable dynamic reward and punishment mechanism adopted by the government regulatory agencies is helpful to effectively crack the conspiratorial behavior of the live streaming platform to hide and connive in the false propaganda of live streaming.Finally,the paper sorts out the results of the above two game analysis and simulation analysis,summarizes the problems existing in the supervision of e-commerce false publicity,and puts forward suggestions for the behavior strategy selection of government regulators,live streaming platform,consumers and platform merchants,so as to enrich the research content of supervision of live streaming fake publicity.