| Open banking is an active exploration for commercial banks to make digital transformation and seek market initiative in order to get rid of market difficulties under the new development trend.However,the current development of open banks in China is still not perfect,the relationship between the participants in the open banking ecosystem is not yet clear,and the opening of open banks in the process of opening has not yet involved the opening of the data level,which cannot realize the real value of open banks and meet the needs of all participants.Therefore,it is of great significance to analyze the relationship among the participants in the open banking ecosystem,put forward countermeasures and suggestions for the participants,and then promote the harmonious development of the open banking ecosystem.This paper takes the open banking ecosystem where SPDB is located as an example.First,based on the evolutionary game theory,we build a tripartite evolutionary game model of the open banking ecosystem under the condition of no customer group and after the introduction of customer group,and then analyze the stability strategy according to the model to obtain the equilibrium points of the open banking ecosystem under different conditions.And the MATLAB software is used to conduct simulation and optimize the model in combination with prospect theory to analyze the impact of parameter changes on the evolution path of each participant in the open banking ecosystem under different conditions to further verify the results of evolutionary game analysis,draw out the influencing factors affecting the cooperation of each participant in the open banking ecosystem and put forward suggestions for each participant accordingly.Through this study,it is found that both the revenue sharing ratio and the cost sharing ratio of SPDB and third-party institutions in the cooperative construction of an open bank will affect their strategic choices.When the higher the revenue sharing ratio of participants and the lower the cost sharing ratio,the stronger the participants’ willingness to cooperate in the construction of an open bank.And the government departments’ appropriate incentives to the departments participating in the construction of the Open Bank are conducive to encouraging the participants to build the Open Bank.At the same time,it is found that the liquidated damages agreed upon when commercial banks sign contracts with third-party institutions can reduce the government’s regulatory costs from the side.The smaller the gap between the gains from the non-standard operation and the standardized operation of open banks,and the greater the government’s punishment on the non-standard operation of open banks,the more open banks tend to choose the standardized operation.After introducing the prospect theory to optimize the model,it is found that the strong third-party institutions in the SPDB ecosystem prefer risk,while the weaker ones are more conservative.In the open banking ecosystem,the strategic choices of open banks,government departments and customer groups will be affected by their own risk preference,among which customer groups will be most affected,and the uncertainty of customer groups on losses will also affect their strategic choices in the open banking ecosystem. |
