Analysis Of The Game Behavior Of Three Parties In Urban Village Transformation Based On Prospect Theory And Research On Regulatory Countermeasures

The study of urban village transformation is an important way to solve the difficulties in carrying out urban village transformation,coordinate the distribution of interests and predict the state of urban village transformation.Due to the formation reasons and process of urban villages,it has the characteristics of multiple interest subjects and complicated interest entanglements.It is the key to break through the difficulties of urban village transformation and promote social and economic development to sort out the interests of each stakeholder in the process of urban village transformation,find the important influencing factors affecting the decision making behavior of each stakeholder and coordinate and control them.At present,the research on the interest balance mechanism of urban village transformation has been relatively adequate,but there is still a lack of research on the evolutionary game model fit of the developer-indigenous residents-local government triad of urban village transformation.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper focuses on the theme of "analysis of the decisionmaking behavior of the evolutionary game based on the prospect theory of urban village transformation of three parties",and starts the research from constructing the game matrix to solve the equilibrium strategy and establishing the simulation to reveal the sensitivity of the parameters to analyze the role of important influences,and the following is the specific research of this paper:(1)Analysis of the behavior of a three-party evolutionary game for urban village transformation.The prospect-theoretic individual influence on the behavioral decision gain and loss is analyzed,and the absolute gain and loss relative to the decision outcome in the gain matrix is replaced by the relative gain and loss relative to a reference point considering the marginal decreasing loss gain and loss aversion,and a prospect-theoretic three-party evolutionary game model for urban village renovation is constructed.And then the Jacobian matrix is solved by solving the replicated dynamic equations and the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point is determined by using Liapunov’s discriminant method.The solution finds that the speculative gain of the developer is the key factor in this study game problem,and when it is in different size relationships with other parameters,it corresponds to two evolutionary stability strategies of the prospect theory-based tripartite evolutionary game model of urban village transformation respectively: When the speculative gain of the developer is greater than its overall perceived loss,the strategy combination {speculation,active participation,no regulation} is the evolutionary stable strategy for this game problem;when the speculative gain of the developer is less than its overall perceived loss,the strategy combination {no speculation,active participation,no regulation} is the evolutionary stable strategy for this game problem.(2)Analysis of the mode of action of the important factors affecting the decision of each game party.The simulation program is established according to the game model,and the parameters are set with the existing research and research background to verify the validity of the three-party evolutionary game model of urban village transformation based on the prospect theory.After proving the validity of the model,different intervals are reasonably taken to analyze the sensitivity of the obtained important parameters,reveal the influence on the decision making willingness of the game parties when these parameters change,summarize the convergence law of the decision making behavior of each game party and the change law of the evolutionary stabilization strategy,and find that the degree of diminishing marginal returns,the degree of diminishing marginal losses,the degree of loss aversion,and the speculative returns of developers have different degrees of influence on the evolutionary stabilization process of the game.The game has different degrees of influence on the evolutionary stability process.(3)Integrating the first part and the second part,we analyze the convergence law of the decision-making behavior of each game party and the change law of the evolutionary stabilization strategy,and give suggestions for the improvement of the regulatory strategy of government departments,the regulatory countermeasures for developers’ enterprises,and the policy adjustment for residents respectively,taking into account the needs of social development.This paper studies the urban village renovation problem as a complete three-party game as a whole with developers,indigenous residents and local government,and introduces prospect theory to strengthen the fitting,which broadens the research perspective of urban village renovation problem and enhances the theoretical support of urban village renovation research.The game behavior of each game party is analyzed in depth,the process of the role of important factors and the game equilibrium strategy are analyzed,and corresponding regulatory countermeasures for urban village transformation are proposed according to the research findings,which are of reference significance for coordinating the conflict of interests in the process of urban village transformation,improving the existing regulatory countermeasures,and helping to promote the smooth development of urban village transformation work.