The Evolutionary Game Research On The Model Selection Of Car-sharing Platform

As an important strategic deployment for energy saving and emission reduction and "curving overtaking" in the automotive sector in my country,new energy vehicles are also an important layout for the realization of driverless technology.They are one of the new strategic industries supported by my country and receive a series of policies such as national subsidies.stand by.However,with the gradual maturity of the new energy vehicle market,state subsidies for the purchase of new energy vehicles have gradually declined.In the "post-subsidy" era,how to improve the current financial subsidy policy for new energy vehicles and realize the smooth transition of the new energy vehicle market from "policy-driven" to "market-driven" is a realistic problem facing the current government.This thesis focuses on the car-sharing rental market and divides the government’s subsidy policy into three methods,namely,non-subsidy state,fixed subsidies for car-sharing rental platforms,charging piles and operating subsidies,and dynamic car-sharing rental platforms.Subsidies and charging piles and operating subsidies are used to construct and derive the evolutionary game model of the car-sharing platform and consumers with government participation.The model is simulated and analyzed using Matlab R2020 a software,and the research is to guide the car rental platform to choose new energy vehicles.Leasing,whether the government should provide subsidies to the platform under different market conditions,and what kind of subsidies should be provided,so as to provide a reference for changes in government subsidy policies under different market conditions,and buffer the negative impact of subsidy decline on the new energy vehicle market Impact,to achieve a stable and healthy development of the new energy vehicle market.The research results show that the government should determine the current policy based on the current development stage and market situation of the car-sharing market.First of all,the gap between the profit of new energy vehicles leased by the car-sharing platform and the fixed cost of purchasing fuel vehicles determines the effectiveness of government subsidies.When the platform uses new energy vehicles or fuel car rentals at a severe loss stage,the government’s subsidy to the car-sharing platform is inefficient and cannot change the final evolution of the system.At this time,the government adopts a non-subsidy strategy.Secondly,when the profit loss of car sharing platforms renting new energy vehicles and fuel vehicles is within a certain reasonable range,government subsidies to car sharing platforms are effective.At this time,the initial proportion of platforms and consumers choosing new energy vehicles and the main decision-making factors will affect the evolution path and evolution results of the system.(1)Changes in government policies should pay attention to the impact of the initial ratio.Within a certain initial ratio,the government’s fixed subsidies will make both parties in the game ultimately choose new energy vehicles,while no subsidy or variable subsidies will make both parties ultimately choose fuel vehicles,indicating that the change in government subsidy policies will indeed cause certain losses.(2)When the government adopts variable subsidies,in order to compensate for the impact of subsidy decline,increase the purchase tax of fuel vehicles,increase subsidies for platform charging infrastructure construction and charging fees,stimulate the number of leases of each new energy vehicle,and improve the environmental protection of new energy vehicles The utility and reducing the consumer utility loss caused by the mismatch of charging piles can increase the probability that the platform and consumers will eventually choose new energy vehicles,and realize the promotion of new energy vehicles in the time-sharing leasing market.