Study On Collaborative Innovation Strategy Of Industrial Software Supply Chain Based On Three-Party Evolutionary Game

Innovation is the first driving force to lead development,and General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed that "we should make scientific and technological innovation and institutional innovation work together,fully exploit the supporting and promoting role of scientific and technological innovation on economic and social development,enhance China’s independent innovation capability,and accelerate the construction of an innovative country." At present,although China has entered a new period of innovation exploration,many software,chips and other core technologies are still facing the problem of "stuck neck",independent innovation has become an effective path for China’s core enterprises to defend against political sanctions from other countries and cope with the external turbulent environment.Based on the theoretical basis of collaborative innovation and evolutionary game,this paper considers the current situation of collaborative innovation in industrial software,and considers the impact of enterprises in the industrial software supply chain on the benefits and costs of software use and service optimization as the two sides of the game.This study investigates the strategic choice between the main players in the industrial software supply chain and the collaborative strategy choice.By constructing a three-party evolutionary game model of the government,domestic software vendors and industrial software application enterprises,the evolution of each subject’s strategy is analyzed under the influence of time changes and changes in relevant factors such as cost,revenue and government subsidies.The conclusions show that the introduction of the government subsidy factor will the subjects in the industrial software supply chain to carry out collaborative innovation,the allocation coefficient α of the total amount of subsidies between the domestic industrial software vendors and the application enterprises and the proportion δ of the cost to be shared by the enterprises using the domestic software vendors will affect the strategic choice of both.For industrial software application enterprises,only when the government subsidies or software vendors to reduce the cost of use of a certain proportion,will choose to use domestic industrial software,participate in the domestic industrial software supply chain innovation.Similarly for software vendors,only when they receive a certain level of subsidy incentive and direct and indirect benefits will they choose to provide advanced software functions,and then carry out iterative innovation of industrial software to improve the efficiency of supply chain collaborative innovation.Based on the model simulation results,corresponding countermeasures are proposed for each subject.Through the research of this paper,it provides a basis for the strategy choice of each party in the independent innovation of industrial software supply chain,and provides a basis for the government to promote the independent innovation of industrial software and formulate the subsidy allocation policy to promote the collaborative innovation of industrial software supply chain.