The Evolutionary Game Analysis Based On New Energy Vehicle Subsidies And Dual-credit Policy

Stimulated by the new energy vehicle(NEV)subsidy policy,China’s NEV industry has developed rapidly.However,with the continuous growth of NEV consumption and the frequent occurrence of false subsidies,the efficiency of the subsidy policy has been greatly reduced.In2017,the government introduced a dual-credit policy.The government hopes to use the credit assessment mechanism to guide market competition.Then,under the influence of increased subsidies reduction and the dual-credit policy,the decision-making of a NEV manufacturer and a traditional fuel vehicle(FV)manufacturer will be more challenging.What factors will affect their equilibrium decision-making? On the other hand,the government,as a leader in the development of the vehicle industry,needs to quantify the impact of different policies(subsidy policy and dual-credit policy)on the diffusion of new energy vehicles(NEVs)and make timely dynamic adjustments.Based on the above background,this article first constructed an evolutionary game model between the group of NEV manufacturers and the group of FV manufacturers.When solving the game model,we first consider the two types of auto manufacturers in a specific small market.A duopoly game was carried out between them,and the influence of subsidy and dual-credit policy on the production decisions of two auto manufacturers was studied.At the same time,based on the subsidy and dual-credit policy,the influence of government subsidy and dualcredit policy on the proliferation of the population of NEV manufacturers is analyzed by constructing an evolutionary game model between auto manufacturers.Secondly,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between auto manufacturers and the governments to analyze the impact of government subsidy and dual-credit policy on auto manufacturers’ decision-making and the dynamic trends of the electric vehicle industry.Considering the impact of different government policies on the production decisions of auto manufacturers,we study the impact of government policies on the development of the electric vehicle industry under three decision scenarios: static subsidy and static dual-credit scenario,dynamic subsidy and static dual-credit scenario,and static subsidy and dynamic dual-credit scenario.Based on the above three scenarios,a stable strategy solution to the evolutionary game between the governments and the auto manufacturers is derived.Finally,a numerical verification was carried out by taking the current Chinese electric vehicle industry as an example.Through research,we found that(1)increasing the fixed market capacity of NEVs,the ratio requirement of NEV credit,the standard of NEV credit and the subsidy coefficient can all increase the proportion of NEV manufacturers.(2)In the early stage of the Chinese vehicle market,the government may consider simultaneously implementing subsidy and dual-credit policy to increase the proportion of NEV manufacturers.When the proportion of NEV manufacturer reaches a specified value,it can increase the dual-credit proportion requirements to replace government subsidy on the supply side.(3)Under the three decision scenarios,the evolutionary game exhibits fluctuations,and there is no stable strategy between game players.Compared with the replication dynamic system based on the static subsidy and the static dualcredit policy scenario,the volatility of the replicated dynamic system under the static subsidy and dynamic dual-credit policy scenario is significantly less than that of the replicated dynamic system under the other two scenarios.That is to say,the replication dynamic system based on the static subsidy and dynamic dual-credit policy scenario is most stable.Currently,the proportion of auto manufacturer choosing to produce NEVs and the possibility that the government chooses to implement the dual-credit policy have the least volatility,both of which is close to 0.75.