Research On The Game Behavior Of Oligopoly Shared Vehicle Operators Based On Multi-factor Disturbance

With the increase in vehicle ownership,carbon pollution and traffic congestion in cities are increasing.With the birth of the sharing economy,the emergence of shared vehicles is expected to solve this problem.However,in the actual development of shared vehicles,there are many social factors,including insufficient parking resources and so on.Based on the current status of shared vehicles’ operations,combined with the government’s carbon emission reduction policies and "Double Control" policy,and considering multiple disturbance factors,the thesis builds a Stackelberg game model between different types of oligopoly shared vehicle operators based on three land resource expansion models(Independent Expansion,Rental Expansion,and CoConstruction and Shared Expansion),and analyzes the impact of relevant parameters on the operator’s decision variables and profits.Operators are mainly divided into two types: Shared Electric Vehicle(SEV)and Shared Fuel Vehicle(SFV).SEV operators are the market leaders.On this basis,the thesis further builds a dynamic game model between different types of oligopoly shared vehicle operators,and analyzes the stability and complexity of the system under each extended model.Then,it intuitively demonstrated the influence of relevant parameters on the operator’s order price and other variables in the form of numerical analysis.Through related research,the main conclusions of the thesis are as follows:1.The rental cooperation model has the highest system stability.However,under this model,SEV operator often refuse to cooperate with SFV operator due to the loss of profit.However,SFV operator will seek cooperation with start-up SEV operator based on the game environment of the market.2.The Co-Construction and Shared Expansion model between oligopoly operators often brings more revenue to each operator than the other two models,making it easier to achieve the overall Pareto Optimality of the market.However,the market stability under the Co-Construction and Shared Expansion model will be greatly reduced.And under this mode,the market stability will be further reduced as the heterogeneity of the operators’ products becomes larger.3.Excessive order price adjustments by SFV operators will only make their own decision-making disorder,while SEV operators’ excessive order price adjustments will cause pricing disorder in the entire market.However,in the curtailment scenario,the adjustment of the energy storage upgrade level of SEV operators will have an impact on the entire market,and any order price adjustment will not interfere with it.Delay strategy can effectively control the chaotic situation of the system.In summary,the thesis finds that mature operators often profit under the CoConstruction and Shared Expansion model,while start-up SEV operator chooses between Independent Expansion and Co-Construction model and Shared Expansion model according to the situation.At the same time,the thesis also provides suggestions for government departments to better monitor the stability of the market and improve the overall welfare of society.