| At present,the construction of rail transit projects in China is developing rapidly.As a crucial part of urban public transportation,urban rail transit is of great significance to reduce the pressure of urban traffic congestion.In the process of urban rail transit engineering construction,the projects suffer from problems such as occupying or destroying natural resources in the urban ecosystem including arable land and forest land,which causes urban environmental pollution.Considering that there are limited natural resources in urban ecosystems,ecological compensation,as an effective means to solve ecological environment problems,plays an important role in the ecological environment management of rail transit projects in view of the contradiction between rail transit construction and urban environmental protection.However,the ecological compensation of rail transit projects is still in the initial stage currently,and there lacks of sound ecological compensation mechanism.On the other hand,there are many stakeholders in the rail transit projects,and the process of ecological compensation involves complex interests of multiple stakeholders,which is likely to cause conflicts of stakeholders.Therefore,this paper aims to explore the balance of interests among stakeholders in ecological compensation for rail transportation projects.This study mainly focuses on ecological compensation of rail transit projects in the construction period.Firstly,this study explored the impacts of rail transportation project construction on urban ecological environment,and analyzed the factor endowment of ecological compensation of rail transit projects.The value accounting of ecological compensation for rail transit projects and the means of compensation were also examined based on the ecosystem service value theory.After determining the ecological compensation mode of rail transit projects,this study selected the main stakeholders in the process of ecological compensation of rail transit projects,and analyzed the interest relations of central governments,local governments,rail transit construction enterprises,and the public.Based on this,the game relationship of stakeholders of ecological compensation in rail transit projects was then examined in this study.As a mathematical tool at the frontier of mathematical statistics,evolutionary game theory is still in the exploratory stage in ecological compensation of construction projects.Hence,the evolutionary game theory was then performed,and the evolutionary game models of the central governments and local governments,and the local government and rail transit construction enterprises were constructed respectively.Within the context of urgent needs of sound ecological compensation mechanism,the public are involved as another stakeholder and the tripartite evolutionary game model of local government,rail transit construction enterprises and the public was further established.Finally,this study analyzed the strategy choice of each stakeholder and the evolutionary equilibrium conditions of the dynamic game system,which could provide theoretical basis for the ecological compensation of rail transit projects.After that,this study conducted an empirical analysis of the dynamic game equilibrium process of each stakeholder taking X rail transit project in B city of A province as an example.The results showed that the evolutionary game system reaches a stable equilibrium state when central governments do not supervise ecological compensation and local governments implement ecological compensation-related policies.Besides,the behavioral strategies of local governments and rail transit construction enterprises are to supervise and execute the ecological compensation respectively.Within the context of enhancing ecological compensation mechanism,the public are involved to participate in ecological compensation of rail transit projects,and then the local governments,the rail transit enterprises and the public experience a three-party dynamic game process.At this time,the evolutionary game system composed of three stakeholders can maintain a stable equilibrium state when the local governments supervise the ecological compensation,the rail transit enterprises complete the ecological compensation work,and the public participate in supervising the ecological compensation of rail transit projects.The above findings are consistent with the equilibrium states of stakeholders expected by the society,which verifies the rationality of the established evolutionary game model and the universality of the conditions of equilibrium states.The results also showed that in the evolutionary game system between the central governments and local governments,the compensation fund of the central governments and the implementation cost and benefits of the local governments are important factors affecting the equilibrium.In the game process between local governments and rail transit construction enterprises,the increase of incentives and penalties of local governments will promote the implementation of eco-compensation by rail transit construction enterprises to achieve a stable equilibrium state.In the tripartite evolutionary game system after the public are involved in ecological compensation,the participation willingness of the public decreases with the increase on their supervision cost.Based on the above findings,this study put forward countermeasures and suggestions to promote the improvement of ecological compensation mechanism of rail transit projects.Finally,this paper analyzed the synergistic process and organizational elements of stakeholders of ecological compensation in rail transit projects,and a synergistic mechanism of ecological compensation for stakeholders based on the multi-agent system was developed in this study.The proposed mechanism contains working modules including supervision and monitoring,information feedback,task coordination and summary evaluation,which can promote the ecological compensation and environment management of urban rail transit projects,so as to facilitate the development of ecological civilization in China. |
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