Research On Capital Compensation Decision Of Rail Transit PPP Project With Minimum Passenger Flow Guarantee Provided By Government

The introduction of the Public-Private-Partnership(PPP)model in the field of infrastructure construction has effectively alleviated government financial pressure,promoted the efficiency of public product supply,and improved the quality of project operation management and service.Among them,the rail transit PPP project is the most representative and typical.However,as a kind of quasi-operational rail transit PPP project,while taking the social benefits of government departments into account,the project's own revenue alone cannot cover the social capital party for the purpose of maximizing investment returns.In this regard,government departments usually provide capital compensation to social capital party in order to attract them to invest and protect their reasonable returns.What's more,considering the uncertain characteristic of the passenger flow during the concession period,the social capital party usually requires the government department to provide a minimum passenger flow guarantee clause to reasonably share the project passenger flow demand risk.However,the minimum passenger flow guarantee clause generally contains huge option value while the current rail transit PPP project value evaluation model based on the DCF(Discounted Cash Flow)method often ignores the option value contained in the aforementioned clauses,resulting in the overall value of the project being underestimated,which leads government capital compensation decision errors.And as one of the key decision variables in the rail transit PPP project concession agreement,capital compensation play an important and decisive role in the success of the project operation.In this regard,this paper takes the rail transit PPP project as the research object,and uses a combination of real options and game theory to study the capital compensation decision of government departments under the provision of guaranteed minimum passenger flow.Specifically,the main research contents of the paper are as follows:First of all,the related research of rail transit PPP project value evaluation and compensation is reviewed,and then the connotation,necessity,model and influencing factors of rail transit PPP project compensation are analyzed,and the key influencing factors of compensation are identified.Then,with the combination of real options and game theory,a capital compensation decision-making model for rail transit PPP projects with the minimum passenger flow guarantee clause provided by the government is constructed.The decision-making process is divided into two steps: step one,taking the value of options and the acceptability of different investment entities for the amount of capital compensation under this clause into account,the investment value of the rail transit PPP project by different investment entities under the guarantee of the aforementioned clauses is evaluated based on the real option method.Then on this basis,the model of the maximum amount of capital compensation that the government departments can provide and the model of the minimum amount of capital compensation that can be accepted by social capital party are constructed,and the feasible region of capital compensation have been obtained.Step two,in order to further obtain the equilibrium solution of capital compensation,based on the different strategic behaviors of government departments and social capital party in the negotiation process,based on game theory,the Nash negotiation game model and cooperative game model of capital compensation were separately constructed and equilibrium solutions of capital compensation under different game models were obtained.Finally,a case study is used to verify that the capital compensation equilibrium solution is positively correlated with the social benefit coefficient,negatively correlated with the minimum passenger flow guarantee value,the concession period,and the government's bargaining power;the investment threshold is positively correlated with the passenger flow fluctuation rate.At the same time,the research results show that the capital compensation decision model constructed compared with the case without government minimum passenger flow guarantee,its capital compensation amount and project investment threshold are smaller,and the overall value of the project is larger,but the value of investment options is related to game model;what's more,the cooperative game model and its equilibrium solution are determined as the optimal decision model and the optimal solution for capital compensation.