Research On The Strategy Of Enterprise OEM Model Based On Signaling Game Under Competitive And Cooperative Supply Chain

In recent years,more and more OEM-type enterprises to undertake brand owners order for processing and production(OEM),at the same time,create their own brand(OBM)to transformation and upgrading for their own development needs,and formed a competitive and cooperative relationship with brand owners.Although the transition to OBM can gain more benefits,there is also a risk of failure: on the one hand,the information on market demand between OEM-type enterprises and brand owners may be asymmetric due to the gap in information forecasting capability.As market competitors,brand owners may pass false information about the level of market demand to OEM-type enterprises in order to obtain higher market prices.On the other hand,as the middle link of the supply chain,OEM-type enterprises are weaker in brand marketing,sales channels and experience,so they face significantly higher sales costs to create their own brands.In addition,as OEM-type enterprises create their own brands to enter the consumer market,they are not competing with brand owners through a fixed order of decisions.Therefore,it is important to explore the choice of optimal OEM model and decision sequence under different information structures and how to use signaling game theory to find an incentive-compatible mechanism for information to enable brand owners to transmit true information.The main research questions and results of this paper are as follows: first,we investigate the optimal OEM model selection problem of OEM-type enterprises.It is found that when the brand owner is the dominant decision maker,In the case of information symmetry,the OEM-OBM coexistence model can bring more profits to the OEM-type enterprises.In the case of information asymmetry,when the cost of sales is low,OEM-type enterprises choose the coexistence model.When the cost of sales is high,as the substitution ability increases,OEM-type enterprises choose OEM model to gain more profit.At this time,the brand owner has the information advantage,the high cost of sales will make the brand owner produce distorted separation equilibrium so that reduce the subcontracting profit of OEM-type enterprises and not conducive to the sale of their own brands,high substitution rate to strengthen market share but further decline in subcontracting profit,so OEM-type enterprises choose OEM model is more advantageous.This means that OEM-type enterprises must carefully consider the cost of sales when creating their own brands in an asymmetric information situation.When the OEM-type enterprises is the dominant decision maker,the OEM-type enterprises chooses the coexistence model under both information structures because there is no information transfer.Second,we investigate the incentive compatibility mechanism of information under asymmetric information.The study concludes that the separation equilibrium solved by the signaling game method is the dominant equilibrium,and at this time the brand owner transmits the real market demand information.However,in the case of high cost of sales,the low type of brand owner will produce a distorted separating equilibrium: downward distortion of subcontracting volume.In addition,we also explore the impact of information structure on the equilibrium outcomes of supply chain members.It is found that when the brand owner is the dominant decision maker,in the OEM model,the OEM-type enterprises is indifferent to the information structure and the brand owner prefers information asymmetry.In the OEM-OBM coexistence model,supply chain members tend to be information asymmetric when the cost of sales is low,and they all tend to be information symmetric when the cost of sales is high as the substitution rate increases.When the OEM-type enterprises is the dominant decision maker,the OEM-type enterprises are indifferent to the information structure and the brand owners prefer information asymmetry.Finally,we investigate the optimal decision sequence selection under the OEM-OBM coexistence model.It is found that in the case of information symmetry,the OEM-type enterprises tend to be decision followers.In the case of information asymmetry,they tend to be decision followers when the cost of sales is low and decision dominators when the cost of sales is high and substitution is strong.