Based On Economic Game Research Of Food Quality And Safety Information Supply Mechanism

In recent years,there have been frequent food safety accidents in China,and false food public opinion incidents have also occurred from time to time.The issue of food quality and safety supervision has attracted increasing attention from consumers.From the perspective of economics,the information asymmetry caused by the insufficient supply of food quality and safety information is the root cause of the frequent occurrence of the above events.How to eliminate the information asymmetry in the food quality and safety information supply,and effectively solve the food quality safety and false public opinion incidents are the major problems facing society at present.The cooperation between the government and third-party testing and certification agencies to provide food quality and safety information can realize the market-oriented supply of information,make up for the lack of a single government supply,and meet the heterogeneous needs of consumers.Therefore,to solve the problem of insufficient food quality and safety information supply,it is of great practical significance to carry out research on the cooperative supply mode of food quality and safety information.This article is based on a comprehensive analysis of the research results of food quality and safety information supply.Starting from the complementary relationship between the information supply between the government and third-party certification bodies,the necessity of the cooperative supply model is demonstrated.Then use the evolutionary game theory and differential game theory in turn to carry out research on the willingness of the two parties to cooperate and the optimal cooperation model.The main contents of this article are: Clarify the current status of food quality and safety information supply issues,Analyze the current problems in food quality and safety information supply;Build an evolutionary game model of the willingness of the government and third-party certification agencies and food companies to participate in the food quality and safety information cooperation supply model,and analyze the strategy selection and key influencing factors of the three parties involved in the game;Construct a differential game model in which government and third-party certification agencies participate in the cooperative supply model of food quality and safety information under different game situations,and analyze the optimal coordination mechanism between the government and third-party certification agencies' strategic returns and overall returns under the four game scenarios.And explore the best benefit distribution coefficient range.The main contents of this article are:(1)When certain conditions are met,the formation of an ideal food quality and safety information cooperation supply model can be accelerated;(2)The best strategy choices for third-party testing and certification agencies and food companies Strategy selection is relevant.When the probability of consumer feedback is low,the government 's optimal strategy choice is cooperative supply;(3)When the income distribution coefficient meets certain conditions,the government subsidizes the strategic activities of third-party testing and certification agencies.It is beneficial to increase the overall revenue of both parties and the food quality and safety information cooperation supply model;(4)The cooperative game situation can more effectively increase the overall revenue of the food quality and safety information cooperation supply model.Coordinating the distribution of the overall revenue is whether the two parties choose the cooperative game situation key.