Supply Chain Contracts Under Asymmetric Information

In a supply chain, different companies have different, even conflicting goals and make decisions base on their own profit, which results in inefficiency and great loss. How to find a contract (mechanism), make the companies' goal consist with the supply chain's and realizes coordination, is a concern for the academics and practitioners.In a supply chain, asymmetric information can be found everywhere. The informed party may withhold or convey wrong information, and the uninformed party wants to get it or verify it. The screening and signaling increase contract cost, decrease supply chain proficiency. Hence, the asymmetric information is the main cause which leads to non-coordination. Under asymmetric information case, how to design contract to improve efficiency and achieve coordination is the important issue.The dissertation combines the theories and methods in some fields such as Operational Research, Management Science, Economics and so on to study the problem of designing contract and deal with the operation issues related. The main content of the dissertation as follows:In the third chapter, we study a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The demand is stochastic, and influenced by the sales effort. The retailer needs to order his quantity as the same time as his effort level. When the supplier offer the contract, we first prove that the influence of buy back price on the retailer's effort is varied under different conditions. Secondly, we demonstrate that the supplier prefers the buy back contract to wholesale price contract through numerical method. We also put forward the conditions to coordinate the supply chain and three kinds of constrained buy back to coordinate which are given. When the retailer offer the contract, the retailer's optimal quantity and effort are given under the wholesale price contract and buy back contract. At last, we generalize the model to the case that the retailer need to decide the sale price.In fact, The problem considered in third chapter is a principal agent problem. In economics, the first order approach often is applied to convert bilevel problems to single level problems. But, the literatures in economics don't prove that the KKT condition is valid,and if the first order approach is still valid for the multitask principal agent with constraint. In the fourth chapter, we prove that when the agent has only one task, the KKT condition is valid, then, when the task is multiple, under some conditions, the first order approach is still valid.In the fifth chapter, a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer are considered, the latter is the only source for a customized component. Demand is stochastic, the supplier has to invest in capacity before observing the demand, and the manufacturer makes his final order after observing the demand. For affording the loss of overcapacity alone, the supplier will build capacity less than what is the optimal for the supply chain. Two cases are considered. When the supplier's capacity level is private information, we offer three kinds of contracts to improve the capacity level. The first kind of contract induce the supplier build more capacity than with the wholesale price contract, the other two kinds of contracts coordinate the supply chain. When the production cost is private information not known to the manufacturer, the manufacturer will obtain the supplier's true information by offering a menu of contracts.The problem considered in the fifth chapter can be describe by the variational inequality. Hence, it is necessary to study the well-posedness for variational inequality to judge the stability of the sequence of solution. Some articles have study the LP well-posedness for vector vector variational inequality and generalized variational inequality, we will further enrich the study and put forward Various criteria and characterizations for these types of well-posednesses. Relations among these types of well-posednesses are also presented.