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Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Structural Transformation Of China’s Energy Industry

Posted on:2023-02-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Y XuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2530306815466774Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:
With the continuous increase of carbon emissions,the global average surface temperature in the 21 st century is expected to rise by 1.1-6.4 degrees Celsius.China’s climate change is generally in line with the global trend.Over the years,China’s coastal sea level and temperature have been rising,causing serious harm to natural systems such as agriculture and animal husbandry,water resources,coastal zone and forest.If greenhouse gas emissions are not controlled,they will cause irreparable harm to mankind.Therefore,reducing carbon emissions has become a common goal of the world.In recent years,carbon emission reduction index has become one of the important assessment indicators of China’s economic quality development,and has also become an unavoidable key work of economic development.Energy is the basis of economic and social development.In the process of economic development,China will inevitably encounter the problems of energy shortage and environmental pollution.The development of renewable and clean energy has become the general trend.China has formulated specific medium and long-term energy and environmental development goals,and the transformation and optimization of traditional energy structure is an effective way and important means to achieve this goal.This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government,the new energy industry and the traditional energy industry,analyzes the evolution path and stability strategy of the three participants in the process of energy industry transformation,and explores the behavioral strategy of the participants in the energy industry structural transformation and the important factors affecting the energy industry structural transformation.The analysis shows that :(1)the government’s increasing subsidies for the active development of new energy industry will affect the strategic choice of new energy and traditional energy,and the influence of new energy is higher than that of traditional energy industry;However,when the critical value is exceeded,the government will tend to not participate,which will also reduce the speed at which the traditional energy industry chooses the cooperation strategy,thus prolonging the time for the two industries in the system to form the cooperation situation.(2)Reducing the environmental tax of traditional energy industry is conducive to accelerating the cooperation between new energy and traditional energy industry,but when the environmental tax levied by the government is less than the critical value,it tends to not participate in the strategy.(3)The increase in profitability of both new and traditional energy industries will accelerate the speed of cooperation.Under the basic assumption of this model,cooperation brings higher returns than development alone.Therefore,when the profits of the new energy industry are improved,the new energy industry will still actively improve the willingness to cooperate in order to obtain more benefits.The same is true of traditional energy.The results show that there are three mutually beneficial evolutionary stability strategies,the evolution strategy of a single subject will be jointly affected by other subjects,and the new energy industry is more affected by the willingness of government participation than the traditional energy industry.Government subsidies are more sensitive to new energy enterprises,too high subsidies will reduce the cooperation willingness of traditional energy enterprises;Appropriately reducing the environmental tax levied on enterprises that choose to actively transform traditional energy resources will help accelerate the process of bilateral cooperation.The improvement of the overall profitability of the energy industry can accelerate the structural transformation of the energy industry.According to the results,the following suggestions are put forward :(1)give full play to the guiding role of the government and make rational use of fund subsidies and tax policies.(2)Improve the construction of smart grid and speed up the development of energy Internet.(3)Encourage the technological innovation of energy enterprises and improve the profitability of the whole energy industry.Figure 11 Table 4 Reference 111...
Keywords/Search Tags:Energy industry transformation, Stability strategy, Evolutionary game, The simulation analysis
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