Research On The Evolution Of Work Safety Violation Behavior Of Construction Agent Based On Computational Experiment

Work safety is extremely significant,which is the “lifeline” of construction projects and “barometer” of quality safety of project.According to 《Construction Law of the People’s Republic of China》,a project supervision system must be implemented by construction projects.The project tasks(safety and production)entrust to contracting unit(general contractor,subcontractor)by construction unit.The supervision management(safety and production supervision)entrust to supervisory unit by construction unit.Therefore,the construction project has formed a work safety management method that is based on the internal control of the contracting unit and the external constraints of the supervisory unit.In the abstract,in order to ensure the implement of construction work,the construction unit established a double guarantee mechanism of construction work safety to effectively eliminate the hidden safety hazards of the contracting unit and prevent the occurrence of construction accidents.However,in recent years,due to frequent construction accidents and severe situation of work safety of construction,there caused great losses in construction project.The reasons behind the construction accidents have aroused great attention from the society.There are common phenomena in the accident units,such as(1)unqualified subcontractors,(2)inadequate safety measures of the construction unit,and(3)inadequate safety supervision of the supervision unit.Firstly,by means of information asymmetry,principal-agent,complex adaptive system and evolutionary economics theory,four types of work safety violations(collusion in subcontracting,collusion in construction,failure in construction and failure in supervision)of construction engineering agents behind the phenomenon are analyzed,and their occurrence mechanism is analyzed.Secondly,on the basis of fully considering the adaptability of heterogeneous subjects,the dynamics of external environment and the interaction of organizational behavior,the attributes,behavior rules and learning mechanism of each subject in the system are designed,and a computational experimental model of the construction engineering safety production system with the participation of multiple subjects is built.Finally,with the current situation of production safety of the construction project of W Jiayuan Community as the background,the relevant parameters of the model are set,and the Netlogo6.0 software is used to simulate the simulation experiment,to explore how the construction unit gives full play to the role of the project "leading" and effectively restrain the agent unit’s illegal production,so as to ensure the safety production of the construction project.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The construction project agent(general contractor,supervision unit and subcontractor)blindly pursues profit by taking advantage of information to generate violation motivation,and the construction unit,as the initial entrusting party,has institutional defects and governance structure failure due to the "principal-agent" mechanism in engineering projects.That is,because the construction unit’s own supervision mechanism is not in place and the incentive mechanism is not reasonable,it fails to give full play to the "leading role" of the project,which leads to the occurrence of four kinds of safety production violations(subcontracting collusion,construction collusion,construction failure and supervision failure)of the construction engineering agency unit.(2)the construction unit of construction unit contract incentive strategy(increased violation penalties,eliminate safety and production of incentive intensity difference,introducing the safety rewards and subcontract punishment)is difficult to give full play to the role,this is because on the one hand,the contract incentive effect is affected by the supervision company regulation strategy,if the supervision company ritual audit or ritual safety supervision,Will lead to the incentive effect is seriously insufficient;On the other hand,the work safety violations of the construction unit are often superimposed,if the construction unit violation penalty is too strong,may lead to the general contractor not only do not improve the violations,but more inclined to collude in the construction,so as to further worsen the work safety situation.(3)For the supervision unit’s ritualistic qualification audit and ritualistic safety supervision,the contract incentive strategy(enhancing the punishment intensity of ritualistic qualification audit and the punishment intensity of ritualistic safety supervision)fails to effectively restrain the two kinds of violations.This is because the supervision unit’s work safety violations also have the characteristics of superposition.Ritual qualification audit or ritualistic safety supervision behavior is often accompanied by construction collusion.If the construction collusion is not found,the amount of punishment for violations will always be far less than the proceeds of construction collusion bribery,resulting in a serious lack of contract incentive effect.(4)The construction unit’s supervision and restraint strategies for the supervision unit’s ritualistic qualification audit and ritualistic safety supervision behavior(enhancing the intensity of ritualistic qualification examination and ritualistic safety supervision)can effectively guarantee the construction project’s safety production.This is because,first of all,the inspection of the supervision units of the two types of violations will result in the loss of the interests of the supervision units violating the rules,and their tendency to violate the rules will be suppressed;Secondly,two kinds of violations of supervision units to check the strength of ascension will often also found that the construction unit of irregularities,on the one hand,the violation of the construction units need to face,can guarantee the construction unit of contract on the basis of the incentive effect,restrain illegal construction units,on the other hand,conspiring to make construction supervision units can’t live up to its promise,still need to order rectification requirements,As a result,the profit of the general contractor who chooses the construction collusion decreases sharply,thus effectively restrains the motivation of the general contractor to construct collusion.(5)The problem of construction collusion is the biggest crux that hinders the safety production of construction projects.On the one hand,the construction collusion fine can be reasonably raised and professional examination institutions can be introduced to restrain the construction collusion motive of supervision units.On the other hand,the general contractor collusion motivation can be weakened by enhancing the ritualistic qualification examination and ritualistic safety inspection of supervision units,and the construction collusion behavior can be effectively suppressed with the cooperation of various strategies.