Research On The Pledge Rate Decision Of Inventory Financing Under Double Stackelberg Game

The number of small and medium-sized enterprises is huge in China.It is well known that small and medium-sized enterprises play a very important role in the modern national economy.But in real life,small and medium-sized enterprises are facing many problems,such as difficult loans,high cost of loans,narrow channels of loans and so on,and the emergence of the concept of supply chain finance alleviates these problems.Among the various business models of supply chain finance,inventory financing is one of the most widely used and representative models.But due to the diversification and complexity of risks in the business,the risk control problems faced by banks are becoming increasingly prominent.Among many risk control indicators of banks,pledge rate as a key indicator has become the focus of study.At present,in the study of pledge rate,most studies only introduce a variable quantity of guarantee of core enterprises when considering the problem of guarantee of core enterprises,and then analyze the decision-making behavior of banks or borrowing enterprises.There is no in-depth study on the relationship among the three main bodies' decision-making,and few scholars introduce Stackelberg game model to analyze the decision-making process of each main body.In addition,for the sake of simplicity and convenience of calculation,most studies use risk neutrality to measure the risk preference of banks,but in real life,banks are risk averse.Under the mode of inventory pledge financing,assuming that the demand of pledged products fluctuates randomly,but the price remains unchanged during the loan period,this paper introduces the repurchase guarantee mechanism of core enterprises(suppliers)in the supply chain firstly,considers the relationship among banks,core enterprises(suppliers)and borrowing enterprises(retailers),and uses the dynamic game of double Stackelberg game to analyze the decision-making process of banks,suppliers and retailers,and constructs the framework of Stackelberg game model.According to Stackelberg game equilibrium solution method named reverse induction method,the optimal order quantity decision of retailers,the optimal wholesale price decision of suppliers and the optimal pledge rate decision of banks are solved respectively.Furthermore,the Stackelberg game model of retailers,suppliers and banks under partial credit guarantee is constructed to find out the optimal decision of the three bodies,and then compared with the optimal decision of the three bodies under repurchase guarantee,and the conclusion is drawn.Finally,the validity of the conclusion and sensitivity analysis are validated by assigning parameters and programming with the software of MATLAB.The results show that whether it is repurchase guarantee or partial credit guarantee,the optimal pledge rate of bank is negatively correlated with wholesale price of supplier and retailer's order quantity,and positively correlated with sales price of pledged products.At the same time,the pledge rate of bank will increase with the increase of supplier's guarantee degree.In addition,under repurchase guarantee,the retailer's order volume will increase with the increase of supplier's repurchase rate.Under partial credit guarantee,the optimal wholesale price of suppliers will increase with the increase of credit guarantee coefficient.