Research On Participation And Compliance Strategy Of Contract Farming Participants Based On Game Theory

As early as 2018,the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council wrote "Contract farming" into Document One for the first time.Contract farming which can set output based on sales continues to spread.And now it has become an important model of agricultural development in recent years.In the year 2020 to achieve the goal of building a well-off society,the state supports the increase of farmers' income,encourages the contract farming,and promotes the conversion and value-added of agricultural products.Contract farming helps to facilitate the connection between farmers and large markets,and in the rich agricultural management practice,there have been multiple modes of contract farming.Among them,the most classic is the model of"farmers+enterprises".The advantages of contract farming are obvious,but in practice there is a problem of high default rates.Therefore,exploring the factors that affect farmers 'and enterprises' participation in orders and actively fulfilling them,as well as how much these factors affect the performance decision-making of both farmers and enterprises,has important theoretical significance and practical value for improving the agricultural compliance rate of orders.This paper first analyzes the phenomenon of contract farming default and the development environment of China's contract farming,and then analyzes and summarizes the factors that affect the participation and compliance of agricultural and enterprise parties.Specifically,China's political,financial,and technological environment are ready to help the development of contract agriculture.In addition to the defaults caused by natural factors and the deceptive signing of vicious enterprises,the contract farming default in China at this stage is mainly due to the interest-driven default due to market price fluctuations.The factors affecting the participation of both farmers and enterprises in contract farming are caused by individual differences and environmental reasons.In addition to the differences in the sense of integrity,other factors that affect the performance of farmers and enterprises can be two types of benefits and costs.In researching the compliance strategy of the participants in contract farming,the dynamic evolution game method is mainly used to construct a dynamic game model based on the income between farmers and enterprises.The study found that,in order to achieve the strategic results of both parties' compliance,it must be satisfied that the performance benefits of obtaining favorable environmental rewards are greater than the residual benefits of active default.Increasing the compliance gains of both parties by rewarding compliance,improving the credit rating in the agricultural finance sector,and increasing the cost of default can promote the reluctance and default of agricultural and business parties,thereby increasing the performance rate of order agriculture.Finally,based on the research conclusions,specific suggestions are made for the development of contract farming in China.