Dynamic Game Analysis Of Three-level Quality Supervision In Engineering Supply Chain

Engineering construction industry plays an important role in the development of the national economy,and the quality of engineering directly affects the investment benefits of the national economy and the vital interests of the people.The formation of engineering quality is a dynamic process affected by many parties in the construction supply chain.Among them,the main body that has the biggest influence on the project quality is the owner,the supervisor and the construction party.In order to standardize the construction process,strengthen supervision and improve engineering quality,it is necessary to comprehensively analyze the game behavior of three-level quality supervision in engineering supply chain.This paper is analyzed from the following three aspects:(1)The continuous-time differential game model of construction quality for the three-level supply chain consisting of the project owner,supervisor,and constructor were developed by using the Nash non-cooperative game method and the Stackelberg master-slave game method.Then the optimal quality supervision strategy and the three-party equilibrium return for the two different game situations were obtained by solving the model.The results show that: it is a Pareto improvement from Nash non-cooperative game to Stackelberg incentive game.The Influence law of parameters such as effort cost coefficient,benefit coefficient,work level,punishment intensity,loss cos of quality accident,occurrence probability of quality accident,discount rate,etc.to the three-party effort degree and the optimal cost sharing ratio were discussed by analyzing and numerical simulating.(2)Considering the participants characteristics of bounded rationality and risk preference,the dynamic game relationship between the owner,the supervisor and the contractor in engineering quality management was studied and discussed by combining prospect theory with evolutionary game theory.The equilibrium point is obtained by establishing perceptual payoff matrix and replication dynamic equation.Then,the influence law of the participants initial willingness,perceived cost,perceived loss,penalty for violations,and the loss discount coefficient of engineering quality problems on the evolutionary game results were discussed through numerical simulation analysis.The results explain the internal mechanism for the various quality management phenomena and provide a reference for the design of the quality management system.(3)In order to truly reflect the dynamic change process of the quality management of the engineering supply chain under the uncertain environment,this paper introduces Gaussian white noise as a random interference item into the evolutionary game,establishes a profit matrix,and analyzes the three parties including the owner,the supervisor and the construction party in the uncertain environment Stability of strategy selection,and numerical simulation of It(?) stochastic differential equations with stochastic Taylor to analyze the influence of each influencing factor on the evolution result.Studies have shown that parameters such as the initial willingness of the three parties,the rectification expenditure ratio coefficient when the illegal work is discovered,the loss transmission coefficient after the project quality problem occurs,and other parameters can change the strategy choice of the game player,and random interference has advantages and disadvantages in the role of strategy selection.