The Separation Of Two Powers And Investment Efficiency Of The Ultimate Controller Based On The Perspective Of Senior Executive Salary Stickiness

The agency problem is an important research topic in corporate governance.With the continuous improvement of corporate governance theory,the study of agency problems has become more and more in-depth.For the second type of principal-agent problem,scholars have found that through a complex shareholding structure,the company can have the ultimate existence There is a separation of powers between the controller and the ultimate controller.The research on the ultimate controller mainly focuses on its "support" or "empty" behavior to the company.Recently,the sky-high salary of executives has been frequently exposed on the Internet,and high salary has attracted people's attention.There are also two completely different explanations for this.On the one hand,the sticky system is a cover for the executives' "reward and punishment",on the other hand,it is an incentive for the executives to take risky investments.At present,few studies have revealed the path of the influence of the separation of the two powers of the ultimate controller on investment efficiency,and there are few empirical studies on the effect of the separation of the two powers on stickiness of execs' compensation.In this paper,the separation of two powers,stickiness of execs' compensation,and investment efficiency are constructed as a whole model for analysis.From the perspective of executive compensation stickiness,the relationship between separation of two powers and investment efficiency is studied.Through the analysis of the principal-agent theory and the optimal compensation contract theory,the influence path of separation of two powers-executive compensation stickiness-investment efficiency is proposed,and the panel data that meets the screening conditions in the A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 is used as a sample To establish a regression model of separation of two powers and stickiness of execs' compensation,separation of two powers and investment efficiency,and to examine the mediating effect of execs' compensation stickiness.Research shows that:(1)The phenomenon of executive pay stickiness is widespread,and the separation of the two powers of the ultimate controller will aggravate the phenomenon of executive pay stickiness.(2)The problem of non-investment efficiency is widespread.When the ultimate controller holds higher cash flow rights,it has a restrictive effect on the enterprise's non-efficient investment.(3)The greater the separation of the two powers of the ultimate controller,the more serious the overinvestment of the enterprise.There is no significant correlation between the ultimate degree of separation of powers and underinvestment.(4)The remuneration stickiness of executives plays an intermediary role in the separation of the ultimate controller's two powers on the overinvestment of enterprises.Executive compensation stickiness is not the only intermediary variable,it plays a part of the intermediary role in this influence path.Based on the research results,this article proposes suggestions on the phenomenon of executive stickiness and inefficient investment from the aspects of disclosure regulations of executive compensation system,optimization of company shareholding structure,and corporate governance,aiming to reduce agency costs and protect the interests of small and medium shareholders.