| Executive compensation has always been considered as an effective means to solve the problem of modern principal-agent.When the interests of the owners are in conflict with the managers' interests,the executive pay contract which is linked to the performance can motivate the executives to work hard and create wealth for shareholders.However,with the slowdown in economic growth in recent years,the performance of some enterprises is not ideal,but the salary of corporate executives is still high.This salary does not decline with the performance of the enterprise,which we call the compensation stickiness.It is clear that the high salary of business executives is at the expense of the interests of the shareholders.The frequent occurrence of pay disorder such as "sky high salary" and so on,has more and more negative impact on investors' confidence.At the same time,it also causes people to ponder over the performance salary system,and begin to question its rationality and perfected.Therefore,the research of executive compensation has become a hot topic among scholars.There is no doubt that the stickiness of the salary will boost the adventurous spirit of the executive,and increase the investment level of the enterprise and satisfy the motivation of self-interest.The investment activity of the enterprise is an important part of maximizing the wealth of the investors.Appropriate investment level can help enterprises find the profit point and get a new profit growth point.Excessive investment level may lead to the fragmentation of capital chain and inefficient operation,even affect the optimal allocation of social resources.Therefore,this paper mainly focuses on the impact of the existence of "executive compensation stickiness" in the listed companies on the investment behavior of the enterprises.At the same time,combined with the components of the existing market and the components of the government in the socialist market economy,this paper explores the relationship between executive compensation sticky and corporate investment behavior from two different aspects: market economy and government subsidy.This study selects data from A share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities from 2011 to 2016 as samples to explore the correlation between wage stickiness and corporate investment behavior.The results show that:(1)the stickiness of executive compensation is positively related to investment behavior,that is,the greater the stickiness of executive compensation,the higher the investment level of the enterprise.(2)in the same industry,the more government subsidies are received,the stickiness of executive compensation can stimulate enterprise investment behavior more.(3)compared with enterprises with relatively fierce market competition,executive pay sticky has a stronger positive impact on corporate investment activities than those with less competitive market. |
PDF Full Text Request