Research On Government Financial Supervision Under The Trend Of Financial Mixed Industry

Since the 18 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,more and more attention has been paid to the problems in China's financial supervision.Currently,under the trend of mixed financial management,there are many problems in the regulation of financial by divided operation and management in our country,such as inefficient supervision,repeated supervision,monitoring blind spots,regulatory competition and poor communication of information.On the basis of predecessors' research,this paper based on game theory method,applying theoretical research combining with empirical analysis to investigate the problem of financial regulation.We find that financial regulation cost,incentive compatibility mechanism and information sharing mechanism are all important factors affecting financial regulation.Among them,we focus on the analysis of financial regulation through game theory.Through the analysis of game theory,the author draws the following conclusions and rules:When financial institutions will enter the market.Firstly,the cost that the financial institution should pay for the supervision has no effect on the probability of supervision by financial regulators and probability that financial institutions are qualified,this is also an important factor leading to repeated regulation.Secondly,When the regulatory cost is greater than the social cost,Nash equilibrium at this time is inefficient,Therefore,the regulatory resources should be integrated and the regulatory costs should be reduced,including the coordination costs between departments so as to enhance the efficiency of supervision.When financial institutions are conducting business activities.Firstly,social cost has no effect on the Nash equilibrium of the hybrid strategy.The financial regulation tends to neglect the social cost.Instead,it adjusts the regulatory strategy based on the illegal return obtained from the illegal operation of the financial institution and the expected return loss caused by the supervision and investigation of the illegal operation of the financial institution.That is to say,the financial regulatory authorities can easily adjust their strategies from the perspective of financial institutions instead of considering them from the perspective of the interests of the entire society and thus easily lead to a regulatory vacuum.Secondly,regulators dereliction of duty to bring its own loss of reputation and regulators due diligence to bring their own reputation value have a reverse impact on the the probability of financial institutions operating illegally.Therefore,the introduction of a certain reward and punishment mechanism to the financial supervision department can change the probability of the financial institutions operating illegally.When financial institutions will be withdrawn from the market.Firstly,different conditions have a direct impact on the effectiveness of the regulatory arrangements.When the regulatory arrangements are inefficient,the moral hazard and adverse selection problems will be exacerbated.Secondly,Increasing the moral hazard cost caused by the lender of last resort assistance or increasing the assistance cost of the lender of last resort enables financial institutions to operate more stably.The evolutionary game between financial regulatory bodies shows that,in order to achieve high efficiency in financial regulation,we must first coordinate and optimize the financial regulation system.From the perspective of game theory,the author considers the causes of the problems in financial supervision.The fourth chapter analyzes the other factors that cause the problems of financial supervision.Finally,combined with the above analysis,some suggestions on improving China's financial supervision are given.