Research On FPGA Based Hardware Trojan Design And Detection Methods

In a computing system,microchips are the root of security for the whole system.With the development of information technologies,nowadays,there are emerging trends for attacks on hardware,and hardware Trojans are one of them.A hareware Trojan is a malicious modification to the circuit operated by the attackers.The Trojan affected hardware chips may suffer from information leakage,function change or damage,which bring great threat to the security of the hardware.Therefore,problems on hardware Trojans have raised great concern since ever proposed.FPGAs,as reconfigurable hardware,are widely use in areas which require computing speed and real-time computing such as encryption and encoding because of their ability to reconfigure and high performance.We make this research based on FPGAs to help security analysers analyse and detect hardware Trojans more precisely.Our research is based on the collection and analysis of side-channel information,and focuses on two points:(1)Hardware Trojan design and detection.(2)JTAG hidden instructions scanning.Trojan side-channels are a kind of leakage based hardware Trojans.The secret information is leaked through side-channel,and the attackers can restore the secret through collecting and analysing the leakage.As a standard port,the JTAG port plays an important role in the reading,writing and debugging of chips.However,some researches show that a JTAG might be embedded with backdoor instructions by designers to implement Trojan behaviors.Therefore,it is necessary for security analysers to figure out the instructions a JTAG contain.Focus on the two points above,the main contents of the research are:(1)We propose designs for FPGA based Trojan side-channels.The experiment shows that the attacker can recover the secret by using differential power analysis on the power leakage.(2)With the correlation between the leakage and the secret,we propose a side-channel based Trojan side-channels detection method which can effectively detect Trojans based on power.(3)We make an improvement to the Trojan side-channel design by obscuring the leakage of the Trojan with masks generated by the secret.(4)We propose a method for detection of JTAG instruction register lengths,data register lengths and instruction attributes which lays the foundation for further researches.We test the register lengths of an FPGA,which accord with the expected value.