The Effect Of Property Rights And Media Attention On Capital Budgetary Shirking

As the core content in the construction of management accounting system,budget management is an indispensable internal management control corporate governance tool for modern enterprises.As Chinese enterprises begin to identify and gradually implement budget management,the state is paying more and more attention to the correct application and use of budget management.However,in the case of information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility,the separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises leads to strong motivation and sufficient rights of corporate executives to seek private interests.In the process of implementing budget management,it is not strictly to control the correct use of budgetary funds,and executives use information advantages to pay a low degree of effort,this private budget opportunistic behavior is called budgetary shirking.The budgetary shirking will cause the efficiency of the enterprise operation to decline,as well as the costs of incentives and supervision to increase,infringe on the interests of shareholders,and greatly weaken the effectiveness of budget management control function.Therefore,how to reduce the level of budgetary shirking and improve the budget management efficiency is an urgent task in the field of management accounting in China.In recent years,China's manufacturing industry has continued to develop rapidly and plays a pivotal role in the country's economic growth.Capital investment is an important economic activity to manufacturing enterprises,and capital budget management is a key factor for the success of capital investment.However,corporate executives often have shirking behaviors when implementing capital budgets,which leads to the phenomenon of capital budgetary shirking severance in manufacturing listed companies.Capital budgetary shirking wastes the scarce resources of enterprises and damages corporate value,which is not conducive to the stable development of enterprises in fierce market competition.Therefore,the negative impact of capital budgetary shirking on enterprises should not be underestimated.It is worthwhile for scholars to explore and actively study solutions.With the rapid development of the Internet,the media has become the main transmitter of social information and an emerging force affecting the market economy.Through the information transmission mechanism,the media attention can reduce the information asymmetry between executives and shareholders.Through the reputation mechanism of the professional manager market,the administrative intervention mechanism,and the pressure mechanism of the property rights market,it can form an effective reputational constraint on executives and social supervision.As an external supervision and governance mechanism,the media can remedy the failure of corporate internal governance,can effectively suppress the emergence of executive opportunism,prompt executives to correct their wrong decisions,improve the efficiency of capital budget management,and play a role in corporate governance effects.The existing research focuses on the causes of capital budgetary shirking,and there is few research about governance paths for capital budgetary shirking.This paper takes media attention as a measure of the external governance mechanism of manufacturing listed companies,studies the relationship between media attention and capital budgetary shirking,analyzes whether media attention can become an effective management path for capital budgetary shirking,and enriches the empirical study of capital budgetary shirking.Unlike Western countries,the special system leads to the existence of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in China's economic market.The difference in property rights makes state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises show different behaviors in production activities and management decisions.Based on China's basic national conditions,it is necessary to separately examine the different effects of media attention on capital budgetary shirking in central enterprises,local state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises,and to explore whether the effects of media attention are diverse at different levels of marketization process.This paper selects the financial data of 999 listed companies in China's A-share manufacturing industry from 2015 to 2017 as a research sample,and verifies the relationship between media attention and capital budgetary shirking through multiple linear regression models,and the adjustment effect of different property rights on the relationship of media attention and capital budgetary shirking.The empirical results of the sample show that: firstly,there is a general phenomenon of capital budgetary shirking in China's manufacturing listed companies;second,the higher the media attention,the smaller the degree of capital budgetary shirking,there is a significant negative correlation between them;third,property rights will lead to the different inhibitory effect of media attention to capital budgetary shirking.The media attention to the effect of capital budgetary shirking is more obvious in state-owned enterprises.Fourth,compared with central enterprises,the media attention can effectively monitor the capital budgetary shirking of local state-owned enterprises.Fifth,the marketization process and media attention have a substitution effect.In areas with low marketization process,media attention can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and effectively restrict the capital budget opportunistic behavior of executives of listed companies in manufacturing.At present,the capital budget management control system of Chinese manufacturing listed companies needs to be improved and perfected.The capital budgetary shirking is still unsolved problems.This paper can provide an effective external governance path for capital budgetary shirking through empirical research.First,the capital budget information need to be transparent,the fund control in the process of budget execution need to be strengthened,and connect the assessment accountability mechanism with capital budget to form a rapid management chain.Secondly,strengthen the legal constraints of the media and purify the social environment of the media,and actively play the social supervision of media attention;then,improve the professional manager market in China,improve the impact of reputation mechanism on corporate executives,and make the reputation mechanism form an effective binding force for executive careers;finally,establish a good corporate culture atmosphere which is full of honest and responsible in the enterprise,and invisibly constrains the opportunistic behavior of employees' self-interest.