| With more large-scale production of livestock industry in China,it is difficult for the environment around farms to control livestock pollution under the natural mechanism of self-regulation.At present,government mainly popularizes the modes of eco-chain co-governance of livestock pollution,linked with biogas projects,but the situation isn’t optimistic.In Jiangxi province,the government has invested a large amount of funds in the construction of various-scale biogas projects in order to solve the pollution problems,caused by the rapid development of livestock industry.Therefore,it is of practical significance to further clarify the synergistic mechanism among various stakeholders in several modes of eco-chain co-governance of livestock pollution,currently implemented in Jiangxi.The modes of eco-chain co-governance of livestock pollution is regarded as the research object of this paper.On the basis of previous scholars’ research,we can clarify the relationship between various related stakeholders,analysis their cost and benefit,and adopt the method of game theory in order to get the evolutionary stable strategy as well as the factors affecting the stability of the ecosystem management.In this paper,we introduce the research objects,related concepts and theoretical basis in the first chapter and the second chapter.And then,we focus,in the third chapter,the current situations and modes of eco-chain co-governance of livestock pollution in Jiangxi province.In the fourth chapter,we adopt the method of game theory in order to get the evolutionary stable strategy as well as the factors affecting the stability of the ecosystem management.Finally,we draw some conclusions and put forward relevant suggestions in the fifth chapter.By mainly adopting the theoretical modeling and evolutionary game theory,this paper finally comes to the following conclusions.Firstly,if the users of biogas projects couldn’t make their profits by improving the biogas projects technologies and increasing biogas subsidies,the model of minor cycle of subject would be invalid.Secondly,the breeding enterprises and growing enterprises,in the model of meta cycle of district,wouldn’t always have cooperation with each other,even if they would make profits from the cooperation.Only when the breeding enterprises and growing enterprises all make profits to a certain extent,they would adopt the cooperation strategy.Thirdly,the stability of the model of macro cycle of county depends on the improvement of the overall regulatory system and the profitability of third-party governance institutions. |