Research On The Incentive Mechanism Between The Copyright Owner And Network Intermediary Service Provider In A Network Environment

The characteristics of digitization and networking of information resources make it more convenient for people to obtain information.As the main body of information service,the risk of cooperation between copyright owners and network service providers is becoming more and more significant.How to avoid risks and build a harmonious network of copyright interests has always been valued by researchers.This paper aims at the moral hazard in the process of network information resource sharing.Based on the principal-agent theory,it is carried out from the perspectives of supervision signal and fairness preference.We study the incentive mechanism of network information resources copyright owners and network service providers from the perspective of fairness preference,and the incentive mechanism of network information resources sharing from the perspective of supervision signals.We also discuss the behavior strategy selection mechanism of network information resource sharing under the dual action of supervision signal and fairness preference.First of all,we summarizes the research status of the incentive mechanism of copyright owners and Internet service providers at home and abroad,and analyzes the shortcomings of the existing research.Secondly,we develop the incentive mechanism of copyright owners and Internet service providers in three cases.The fairness preference is introduced into the basic incentive model,and the optimal reward contract is designed.Through the solution of the model and the addition of numerical simulation.The incentive problems in different situations are analyzed and compared when considering fairness preference.Thirdly,the incentive problem between copyright owners and Internet service providers is studied from the perspective of supervision.The supervision signal is introduced into the basic incentive model,and the optimal compensation contract is designed.And in the process of building the model,the public evaluation is introduced,and the simulation is carried out by solving the model and adding numerical value.The incentive problem between the copyright owner and the network service provider are analyzed and compared when the supervision intensity and the public evaluation coefficient are different.Forthly,we consider the game analysis between the copyright owner and the network service provider under the dual action of supervision signal and fairness preference.According to the evolutionary game theory,the behavior mechanism of network information resource sharing is designed under the dual action of supervision signal and fairness preference.The change of behavior factors and the process of strategy selection between copyright owners and Internet service providers are analyzed.Finally,in view of the moral hazard in the process of network information resource sharing,we put forward some suggestions to avoid moral hazard from three aspects: the establishment of fair and just interest coordination mechanism,the establishment of perfect public evaluation system and the establishment of accurate supervision and punishment mechanism.