| Global warming has an increasing impact on the economy.Green economy and low-carbon economy are being recognized by more and more countries.At the same time,it also poses new challenges to the production and operation management of enterprises.In recent years,more and more scholars have paid attention to the research on supply chain management of carbon emission reduction,which has promoted the innovation of supply chain management,which has played a positive role in achieving the economic goal of "both Jinshan and Yinshan,but also green mountains and rivers".Based on this,this paper conducts single-cycle and dynamic multi-cycle studies on the pricing game of supply chain members'emission reduction under carbon regulation.Firstly,a Stackelberg game model dominated by manufacturer is established.Under three supply chain structures composed of manufacturer and retailer,the supply chain emission reduction and pricing game under carbon trading regulation is studied.The optimal decision variables under the three supply chain models and the optimal profits of the members of the supply chain are calculated respectively.Finally,the influence of the relevant variables on the optimal decisions and profits of the members of the supply chain is analyzed.The study finds that consumers'low-carbon awareness has the opposite effect on the manufacturer's optimal unit product emission reduction and wholesale price,while retailer's retail price decreases first and then increases with the increase of consumers' low-carbon awareness,and is proportional to the retailer's profit,while the influence of consumers'low-carbon awareness on manufacturer's optimal profit is related to the supply chain structure;in the supply chain dominated by cleaner manufacturers In China,carbon trading price is directly proportional to the optimal emission reduction per unit product and retailer profit,while the supply chain dominated by polluting manufacturer is opposite.Wholesale and retail prices of products decrease with the increase of carbon trading prices,regardless of whether the leading manufacturers are clean or polluting ones.In the process of carbon trading price affecting manufacturer's optimal profit,the carbon quota allocated by the government and its initial emissions play a decisive role;under the three supply chain structures,regardless of the upstream or downstream competitiveness,the increase of product emission reduction will lead to the same impact on wholesale and retail prices,and the profit of retailers will be increased.The profit of manufacturer increases with the increase of competition among retailers.Secondly,when we study the long-term emission reduction and promotion game between a manufacturer and a retailer,we consider consumers' low carbon awareness and social preferences,The decentralized scenarios of supply chain members in cost-sharing contracts and those without cost-sharing contracts are studied,as well as the decision-making under centralized decision-making.In addition,we also study the impact of some key parameters on the decision-making and performance of supply chain members.Our study finds that raising consumers'awareness of low carbon is conducive to reducing carbon emissions and improving the effectiveness of supply chain members.Cost-sharing contracts can encourage retailers to improve their sales promotion,but the optimal emission reduction efforts of manufacturers are not related to cost-sharing contracts.The proportion of cost allocation increases with manufacturer's emphasis on supply chain membership and decreases with retailer's emphasis on supply chain membership.Cost-sharing contracts change the influence of supply chain members'social preferences and marginal profits on their decision-making.Most importantly,the supply chain system can achieve Pareto improvement through cost sharing contracts.If the manufacturer's goal is to optimize the total profit of the supply chain,then the supply chain system can achieve perfect coordination through cost sharing contract. |
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