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Enterprise Misrepresentation Behavior On The Carbon Emission Transfer In Supply Chain Based On Government's Participation

Posted on:2021-01-08Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S Y GaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2370330629987289Subject:Industrial engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the rapid development of the economy,the emission of greenhouse gases has caused the environment to deteriorate gradually.Governments of various countries have successively issued carbon emission policies.Supply chain enterprises will not only be bound by carbon emission policies,but also affected by the transfer of carbon emissions between enterprises.Moreover,the existence of supply chain carbon emission transfer is not only difficult to determine the carbon emission reduction responsibility of the supply chain main body,but also difficult to achieve the carbon emission reduction target of the supply chain main body and the whole.At the same time,the promotion of low-carbon policies has the problem of asymmetry in carbon information,which may cause false reporting among enterprises.Therefore,with the participation of the government,when supply chain enterprises have carbon emissions misrepresentation,the supply chain carbon emissions transfer and its impact will become more complicated.To this end,in this paper,by building a supplier-led Stackelberg game model,on the basis of comprehensive consideration of the government's initial carbon emission quotas and the impact of government supervision,the carbon of the supply chain enterprises is revealed under the two scenarios of no carbon market and perfect carbon market The mechanism of the impact of emissions misreporting behavior on the carbon emission transfer of the supply chain,and a numerical analysis to verify the conclusion through examples.The research conclusions are:(1)Constructed a game model under the carbon-free market situation and the carbon market perfect situation respectively,analyzed the influence of supply chain enterprises' single-factor misreporting behavior on corporate decision-making and carbon emissions transfer between supply chains,and studied the supply chain enterprises' misreporting Behavior,the construction and impact of carbon emission transfer payment contracts.Research shows:In the context of a carbon-free market,the overall open profit of the supply chain will continue to decrease as the suppliers' carbon emissions transfer increases,but in different underreporting intervals,the impact of the suppliers' carbon emissions transfer on the overall supply chain profits will be different.;In the context of the perfect carbon market,the suppliers' carbon emission transfer volume will have different effects on the supply chain product sales price in different carbon trading price ranges,and the fluctuation of the carbon trading price can change the suppliers' carbon emission transfer volume to the supplier wholesale.The impact of the price;in the two scenarios,the greater the underreporting of the suppliers' carbon emissions,the greater the amount of carbon emissions transferred and the carbon emissions per unit of product will increase,and the number of supply chain products ordered will increase The increase in supplier carbon emission transfers and the decrease in government regulation intensity;the relationship between the supplier unit product carbon emissions,the supply chain product order quantity and the initial carbon quota ratio,and the suppliers' carbon emission transfers are affected in two scenarios The same,but the specific impact coefficients are different;when the transfer payment contract is implemented between supply chain enterprises,the suppliers' optimal carbon emission transfer amount will posted increased costs and reduced.(2)Analyze the impact of supply chain enterprises' two-factor misreporting behavior on the transfer of carbon emissions between supply chains,and study the restraining effect of government punishment mechanism on enterprises' misreporting behavior.The research shows that under the carbon-free market scenario,in different manufacturers' initial carbon emission false reporting intervals,the suppliers' emission reduction cost coefficient false reporting factors will have different effects on the supply chain product wholesale price,sales price,and supply chain product order quantity.;Under the improvement of the carbon market,in a specific carbon trading price range,the supplier carbon emission transfer,the manufacturers' unit product initial carbon emissions false report factor,and the supplier's emission reduction cost factor false report factor affect the supply chain product wholesale price and sales price.The relationship is the same as the carbon-free market;in both scenarios,the supplier's actual profit will increase first and then decrease as the supplier's carbon emission transfer increases,and the supplier's optimal carbon emission transfer will follow the manufacturers' initial carbon emissions per unit of product.The amount of emissions misreporting increases with the increase;it is found that when increasing the intensity of verification or increasing the amount of punishment,the suppliers' optimal decision is to reduce the amount of carbon emissions transferred,and the manufacturers' optimal decision is not to misreport carbon information.
Keywords/Search Tags:Low-carbon supply chain, Carbon emissions transfer, Carbon cap trading, Carbon regulation, Carbon information misrepresentation
PDF Full Text Request
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