The Dynamic Pricing Model Of Two-Sided Platform Considering User Experience

With the increase in the number of Internet users and the popularity of e-commerce,e-commerce has become a new type of transaction channel for businesses and individuals.The rapid development of e-commerce has made its economic and social influence increasingly strong.The e-commerce platform developed on the basis of the two-sided markets theory has enabled e-commerce to gradually migrate from the very beginning to the economy and become part of the national strategy.At the same time,people's needs are not only on the material level,but also gradually increasing the level of experience economy.With the advent of the experience economy,e-commerce platform companies have invested in the wave of experience shops under the layout line to accelerate the integration of online and offline,enhance user experience.At present,user experience is a product of the mobile Internet era.The literature on bilateral market pricing has not incorporated user experience into the pricing model.This article builds a two-phase dynamic game model,analyze the influence of user experience and buyer's expectation on the optimal pricing of bilateral platforms and the selection of pricing strategies from two situations of complete monopoly and duopoly,in order to reveal the dynamic pricing mechanism of bilateral platforms.The study found:In the complete monopoly situation:(1)Regardless of what kind of expectations the buyer holds,there are only two situations where there is an equilibrium solution:the buyer retains all,and the buyer with low experience partially leaves the platform.(2)When the buyer holds negative expectations,the platform should focus on improving the user experience.(3)Compared to the buyer holding a negative expectation,when the buyer holds positive expectations,the monopoly platform company can get more profits.(4)In the monopoly of the platform enterprises,the buyer's reservation is the driving force for its development.Compared with the profit of the two groups under the positive anticipation scenario,when the buyer retains all,the platform company gets more profits.However,in reality,this requirement is difficult to meet.Once again,it shows the importance of the number of users for the platform company.In the case of duopoly competition:(1)The buyer's expectations does not change the existence of the equilibrium solution and does not change the existence conditions of the equilibrium solution.(2)Regardless of what the buyer holds,the platform company' s strategic choices will not change.Whether a platform implements a BBPD policy or an UP policy depends on the difference in user experience and the proportion of high-experience users,and both of them affect the platform's pricing with repeat buyers and transfer buyers.(3)Compared with traditional unilateral enterprises,when the platform implements the BBPD strategy,it causes more users to transfer and exacerbates the competition of the platform companies.(4)When the platform implements the BBPD strategy,it expects the buyer to hold negative expectations,or that the dual-oligopolistic platform companies prefer the buyer to hold negative expectations.Although,in some cases,the platform company will make more profits by implementing the UP strategy,it is not relevant to the buyer's holding expectations at this time.