Font Size: a A A

Compensation Mechanism For Urban Rail Transit Ppp Project Based On Game Between Public And Private Sector

Posted on:2018-03-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z Z HuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330518966986Subject:Civil engineering construction and management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Urban rail transit project has very strong exterior effect,but its construction andoperation cost is high,To ease the government's financial pressure.The introduction of social capital to PPP(public private partnership)mode to urban rail transit project is represent the general trend.However,due to the large scale of investment,operating income,difficulty in internalize the internal revenue from the huge positive external effects,it is difficult to achieve breakeven,only by the operating income,there is no appeal to the social investors who just seeking for profit.Therefore,it is need to design a reasonable compensation mechanism,give economic compensation to social investors additional,to attract social investors to participate in the investment and construction of urban rail transportation PPP project.From the existing related literature of domestic and foreign,the research focus on compensation theory is: explore the various ways of compensation,compensation amount calculation,but rarely have the influence of government studies to private investment decision.In fact,social investors in the investment and financing before a full assessment of the government's compensation policy on the income level of protection.Therefore,the government should establish compensation strategy game mechanism between the government and the deep mining of social investors,in future earnings uncertainty,through the design of both the compensation mechanism of incentive and constraint,fully mobilize social investment enthusiasm,and improve the flexibility of government financial control,To maximize the use of financial capital to guide and enlarge the role of public and private to achieve win-win.In this paper,the following aspects of research work:Firstly,this paper has establish a theoretical framework of urban rail transit project PPP compensation mechanism from four aspects of which are the subject of compensation,the way of compensation,the amount of compensation and the risk of compensation.Expalned theoretical of the urban rail transit PPP project that who should compensate,how much compensation,what the amount of compensation and how to compensate the risk of investment.in Conclusion: the government is the main subject compensation ofu rban rail transit ppp project;compensation method can be divided into financial investment,operating subsidies,real investment,property development(land transfer)mode;compensation quantity combined calculation method of specific compensation,a private sector to meet the net present value of the investment is not less than zero;risk compensation generally reflected in the private sector investment return is determined the rate on the capital asset pricing model(CAPM),weighted average cost of capital(WACC),or the combination of the two kinds of model methods to determine the rate of return on investments.Secondly,explanl the investment compensation in kind model which is widely used in our country,In this mode,the project is divided into two parts,building projects and electrical and mechanical engineering,government invest in the construction of building projectsinvestment as compensation,and lease to the private sector.In this mode,the level of rent is the focus of both public and private negotiations,based on the net present value of both public and private as calculated according to the determined the reasonable range of rent,use Rubinstein alternating offer bargaining game model,to simulate the process of the private parties in the range of the specific amount of rent bargaining,and analysis the real example with data.Finally,put forward and inquire into the compensation mode of the combination of financial investment and operating subsidies compensation,using the idea of induced and incentive mechanism of Stackleberg game model,analyzes the optimal investment strategy when the private sector make a decision independently;analyzes the expectation of optimal construction investment in the private sector and the corresponding operating subsidy when the public sector make a decision independently;When the public and private parties focus on decision-making,the public sector to guide the private sector through the development of operating subsidies,investment in the public sector is expected to invest in the optimal construction investment.Combined with the actual case,draw the conclusion:The government can encourage by increasing spending,pre operating subsidies,guide the private sector to increase investment,while achieving the government's own benefits and social benefits and maximize the private sector investment earnings relative maximization;and the private sector as soon as possible to achieve the operating profit and loss balance.In conclusion,this paper establishes a theoretical framework for urban rail transit ppp project compensation mechanism;Use the Rubinstein bargaining game model analysis of compensation model of real investment,the investment scope of public sector rental,and private negotiations between the two sides of the rent fold impact loss coefficient value;puts forward and inquire into the compensation mode of combination financial investment and operating subsidies.analysis the optimal investment strategy of the private sector by using the Stackleberg game model,he optimal compensation strategy of public sector.The conclusion of this paper provides a new idea for the design of the compensation mechanism of urban rail transit PPP project.
Keywords/Search Tags:Urban Rail transit, PPP Model, Compensation Mechanism, Stackelberg Game, Rubinstein Game
PDF Full Text Request
Related items