Quality Evaluation Of Urban Rail Transit Operationand Game Research On Subsidy And Pricing

With the gradual advancement of chinese urbanization process,the urban rail transit system has taken on the heavy responsibility of alleviating the pressure of urban traffic space and has become an important guarantee for the rapid development of urban economy.As a huge urban public infrastructure,urban rail transit needs to invest a lot of money in the operation stage,and it is still difficult to realize the profit of urban rail transit operating companies only by ticket revenue.Therefore,the financial subsidy from government will become normal to maintain urban rail transit.An important source of operations and corporate profits,and reasonable financial subsidy also affect the operational quality and sustainable development of urban rail transit.At present,the research on operational subsidy and pricing of urban rail transit still stays in economic analysis,and there is still lack of linkage research on operational quality and other factors.Therefore,it is urgent to pay attention to the interaction between subsidy,pricing and operational quality in the urban rail transit operation stage.Taking study on the game mechanism of stakeholder subsidy and pricing problem in urban rail transit operation quality evaluation and incorporating quality evaluation factors,and consider the operational quality.The linkage relationship between subsidy and pricing provides decision support for all parties involved to improve the decision-making efficiency of multi-agents in the operational phase,meet the different needs of various entities,improve the urban rail transit operation service system,and realize the value-added target of urban rail transit.Firstly,by analyzing the operational quality,subsidy,pricing status and problems,it is necessary to consider the operation quality evaluation into the study of subsidy and pricing decision.Secondly,based on the scientific,theoretical,operability and comprehensive principles of index system construction,the urban rail transit operation quality evaluation index system is constructed from the five dimensions of comfort,safety,convenience,timeliness and service management.This is an important reference for games and empirical research.Thirdly,based on the urban rail transit operation quality evaluation coefficient as an important variable,a Stackelberg differential game model between urban rail transit operators and the government considering quality evaluation is constructed to explore price sensitivity coefficient,price adjustment factor,cost coefficient and operational quality.The impact of variables on subsidies,pricing,and optimal passenger traffic decisions.Finally,based on the literature analysis and expert interview results design questionnaire,the empirical research on the operation subsidy and pricing of Fuzhou Metro Line 1 is carried out,and the operational quality score is obtained.Combined with the analysis results of the game model,the analysis is based on questionnaires and research interviews.The situation summarizes the existing problems and proposes countermeasures to improve the subsidies and pricing of urban rail transit operations in Fuzhou.It is intended to provide decision support for government and urban rail transit companies in terms of subsidies,pricing and quality optimization.