Theories And Methods Of Pricing And Subsidizing In Urban Public Traffic Based On Game Analysis

Urban public transit pricing is vital to the development of urban public transit. At the designated level of services in public transit, the partaking rate is determined by price. Thus, the price is very important to the operation and development of public transit enterprises. In response to the nationwide requirement of vigorously promote of the public transit, the price of public transit and financial subsidies should be concerned about to determine the suitable price and government subsidies.Firstly, the definitions, constitutions and characteristics of urban public transit system are introduced. After that, some principles about the price of public transit are expatiated. On the basis of summarization of the pricing and subsidy principles, the game theory has been established in ticket pricing and subsidy of urban public transit.Secondly, price competitions are analyzed by using game theory. The profit influences to public transit enterprises companies and other participants are also explained by pricing strategies. Subsequently, some non-cooperative pricing game models are built in this paper. The subway system and buses with same origination and destination are taken as the example to verify the reasonableness of the model, from which the equilibrium price is calculated.Thirdly, for different modes and different transit enterprises in urban public transit system, the paper uses the game theory to analyze their competitive pricing strategy of cooperation. Furthermore, the paper put forward a non-cooperative transfer model, which some examples are analyzed in game theory. For the cooperative transfer, a Stackelberg game model is established, which mainly concern about the fare ranges.Fourthly, according to the characteristics of public transport, the importance of financial subsidies is aroused. So, some game analyses about mode choice of public or private transit are tested, from which the following conclusion are: mid or low-income groups are concerned about the price; but the high-income groups are more concerned about the level of service of public transit. These conclusions reveal the importance of financial subsidies to the rapid development of urban public transit. For the problem of urban public transit subsidies, the double principal - agent relationships between passengers, the Government and public transport enterprise are analyzed. Besides, a new game model is proposed, which modified the basic principal - agent game model with government and transit companies. Finally, according to the modified principal - agent game model four game models are proposed based on whole subsidy, lump subsidy, passenger volume subsidy and service & cost supervision subsidy. After that, the result of these four subsidy policies are analyzed, it can be found that the passenger volume subsidy with consistent stimulus constraint and service & cost supervision subsidy based on stimulated contract have better results, leading thereby to the reasonable subsidies level and coefficient of rewards and punishment strength.The following are the main conclusions of this dissertation:(1) Summarized the urban transit's characteristics, pricing and subsidy theory and methodology, and researched the reasonability of game models of pricing and subsidy in urban transit;(2) Researched the MNL model which suitable for multiple transit modes, and use the actual data to test the model in different transit modes;(3) Analyzed the cooperative competition strategies, established the cooperative pricing game model and researched the algorithm of punishment function for public transit's cooperation;(4) Determined the travel avail choice model quantitatively, analyzed the equilibrium of mode choice with or without financial subsidies using the game methods;(5) Researched the urban public transit financial subsidies' game model using principal-agent theory, established some models under the different circumstances, and analyzed the subsidy results under these models.