| The ubiquity of cooperation in real world is puzzling because cooperators pay some cost to benefit others,while defeaters don’t.Why natural selection can lead to cooperation draws the attention of researchers in many fields.And different mechanism that can promote the evolution of cooperation was proposed including rewiring,reputation and punishment.But the work about the effect of mutation is limited.With the development of network,information about prospective counterparts in the interaction is incomplete.This uncertainty brings the possibility of cheat.Whether rewiring,reputation and punishment still can promote the evolution of cooperation when cheat is possible remains unknown yet.In this work,we take Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for social interaction,use simulation to look into the effect of mutation and cheat in rewiring,reputation and punishment model.The main work of this paper includes the following 2 parts:1.Reproduce previous work that rewiring,reputation and punishment can promote the evolution of cooperation.And add mutation to these models,find that rewiring mechanism can no longer promote the evolution of cooperation,while reputation mechanism and punishment mechanism still can.2.Based on 1,we define the cheat strategy,and extend the rewiring,reputation and punishment models correspondingly.Consider the influence on the evolution of strategies in different cheat cost and different initial cheating rate.We find that in most model,cheating would induce the decrease of cooperation,sometimes cooperation becomes extinct.But cheat strategy dies out in rewiring model when network is viscous and cheat cost larger than 0.And in punishment model,when network is dynamic,cooperation survives and prospers no matter what cheat cost is.Finally,the initial cheat rate has no influence on evolution. |
