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Institutional Punishment And Social Cooperation With Evolutionary Game Theory Models

Posted on:2021-02-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:K Y WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2370330611464269Subject:Computer software and theory
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Group cooperation has always been a major issue affecting human development.While individuals pursue their own interests,they often damage the benefits of social collectives.Group cooperation is not easy to achieve.Therefore,there are a lot of non-cooperative behaviors in society,and promoting social group cooperation has become the focus.Game theory provides a powerful theoretical framework for studying the formation of cooperative relationships between individuals.At present,in the field of cooperative evolution research,academia has mainly proposed six mechanisms to promote cooperation,of which punishment mechanism preparation is favored because it is similar to the social law enforcement system.In fact,the punishment mechanism and enforcement actions of law enforcement agencies have an important impact on promoting cooperation,and further research is needed.Based on this,this article starts from the perspective of the punishment mechanism,explains the large number of causes of fish farming law enforcement and social universal violations(non-cooperation)under the punishment mechanism,and studies the methods of mathematical modeling,population dynamics and computer numerical simulation.Establish a social punishment system that includes a punishment agency and multiple subjects to explore the level of social cooperation under different rules.The research shows that under the system of law enforcement agencies as a group punishing the uncooperative offenders in the society,there is a behavior of law enforcement team "fish farming law enforcement".After analysis,it is found that the reason for this phenomenon is that there is a positive correlation between law enforcement agencies and fines and confiscations,and a large number of violations can provide them with continuous fine income.In order to maintain this First,the strategy of "fish farming law enforcement" becomes the best choice,so as to reduce the intensity of supervision and punishment and indulge the illegal behavior of civilians.This article also discusses the feasibility of solving the general non-cooperation in society and improving the cooperation of social groups.The punishment pool mechanism is first introduced.Under the help game model,the punishment pool mechanism is introduced by first considering cutting off the link between the proceeds of law enforcement agencies and the fines and confiscations.The social individuals in the model can freely choose to become civilians or police.The civilians play games to help,and the police bear the responsibility of supervising and punishing uncooperative civilians.Civilians pay taxes according to tax rates as punishment pool funds,and police as law enforcement agencies use part of the punishment pool funds for law enforcement,and part of them as their own revenue.After introducing the punishment pool mechanism,we analyze the cooperation situation of the help game model under indirect reciprocity and the steady state of strategy evolution,and find that cost punishment can effectively improve social cooperation under the punishment pool mechanism.Secondly,on the basis of the punishment pool mechanism,a hierarchical punishment system and a hierarchical punishment system with free role selection are proposed.Under the former model,individuals do not have the right to freely choose to become civilians or policemen.The number of policemen and civilians is fixed.The civilians play games for help,and the police carry out law enforcement.The police who fail to perform their duties are punished for their costs.The grassroots police supervise whether the civilians cooperate,and punish the civilians who do not cooperate.The study found that the level of cooperation under such a model has increased significantly,and the evolution of strategies has stabilized.In the hierarchical punishment system model with free role selection,social individuals can freely choose to become civilians or police.Other conditions are similar to the former.The civilians help games and the police enforce the law.The police can control the punishment intensity,tax distribution ratio,law enforcement investment and tax rate of the grassroots police to balance the social evolution after multiple games,improve the level of social cooperation,reduce the non-performance of the police,and make social benefits improved.
Keywords/Search Tags:Indirect Reciprocity, Social Cooperation, Costly Punishment, Evolutionary Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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